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Water demand management is incorporated into a two-step water allocation process in order 
to motivate water users to implement water demand management strategies. In the first step, 
the initial allocation of water is based on existing water rights systems or agreements to form 
a baseline scenario for the next step involving the adoption of water demand management 
strategies. In the second step, two principles are identified for water demand management: 
either to increase aggregated benefits given the currently available water or to decrease 
aggregated water consumption while achieving benefits not less than the current ones. These 
two principles are considered in depth in this research in the development of various water 
demand management methodologies.  
Within the first principle, a centralized basin-wide hydrologic-economic optimization 
model is designed to motivate certain users to conserve water in order to maximize the total 
net benefits of the river basin system, and then to allocate additional net benefits using 
cooperative game theory. The optimal aggregated net benefits with and without water demand 
management plans for various coalitions of users subject to physical, policy and water 
availability constraints are obtained. A modified cooperative reallocation game is developed 
to distribute additional net benefits such that positive economic gains are provided to users. 
From a decentralized viewpoint, agent-based modeling techniques are utilized to simulate 
water users’ behavioral responses to water demand management strategies. Within the agent-
based framework, each user individually decides whether or not to conserve water or to 
consume more water; water conservers are compensated while water consumers are charged. 
Incentive functions are introduced to calculate how much to compensate or how much to 
charge. Individual optimization problems are designed for each water user who considers the 
maximization of its own benefits as the primary objective. Coordination procedures are 
developed to reach the system-wide maximum net benefits objective. 
To achieve the second principle, a centralized conservation-targeted hydrologic-economic 
optimization method is constructed to estimate the minimum water consumption requirement 
to produce the same amount of benefits in a river basin in order to better understand the present 
 
 v 
status of water use. Two formulations for representing different interpretations of water 
consumption are examined. The formulations take conservation limits and diverse 
characteristics of different users into consideration. The method is applied to the South 
Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) in southern Alberta, Canada, where water scarcity is a 
severe issue. 
The foregoing approaches within each of the two principles are applied to illustrative case 
studies to facilitate a better understanding of the impact of water demand management on 
individual users and the overall system, and how to encourage water users to utilize water 
wisely. Meaningful insights are provided for achieving better water demand management to 
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Water is a paradox: scarce but often wasted. The supply of water is limited but the demand for 
water is increasing rapidly. The imbalance between water supply and demand is expected to greatly 
expand as water demand inexorably increases. Water scarcity has been a critical issue for many 
regions and has caused numerous water conflicts. Meanwhile, the value of water itself and the 
many services it provides has not been fully recognized and water has been utilized inefficiently 
in many places. The improvement in water use efficiency and productivity is widely considered as 
the best solution to ensure that future water demand does not exceed water availability, and this 
requires special attention on the demand side. 
Water demand management has already received considerable attention and much effort has 
been expended to study this issue from technical, social, and legal aspects (Baumann et al., 1997; 
Renzetti, 2002; Butler and Memon, 2006; Kindler, 2010). Research and practice have 
demonstrated several unique advantages of water demand management: 
• It can defer or even eliminate the construction of new water supply infrastructure. 
Historically, increasing water supply through the large-scale construction of new water 
supply infrastructure or inter-basin water transfer has been the main solution for solving 
the problem of water shortage. However, this supply-oriented approach often brings 
unanticipated adverse effects such as migration relocation, reduced runoff, and species 
extinction (Gleick, 2003a). These adverse effects could possibly be catastrophic to the 
ecosystem, and also cause many political conflicts. For instance, a downstream province 
or country would be against the construction of a new reservoir to keep water in an 
upstream province or country. In addition, the expenditures, including construction and 
operational costs, of a new water supply project sometimes could be greater than the cost 
of implementing initiatives on the demand side. Therefore, the implementation of water 
demand management strategies would become more viable, both economically and 
politically, in many parts of the world. 
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• Water demand management can improve the social welfare obtained from water 
utilization. The objective of water use is to provide a range of products and services to 
people. For some purposes water is indispensable, such as drinking and cooking, while 
for other uses water is one of the inputs and is manageable. People care about the quality 
of products and services, but may not be concerned about how much water is used or even 
whether water is used at all, as long as these products and services are provided in 
convenient, cost-effective, and socially acceptable ways (Gleick et al., 2011). Water 
demand management initiatives like the employment of advanced technologies enable 
higher production output with much less water input. In addition, preserved water could 
serve indirect purposes which are valuable for society, such as waste assimilation, even if 
the value of these indirect uses is often intangible. 
• It can promote public awareness of the value of water. One of the main reasons why water 
is wasted is that people do not appreciate the true value of water. The adoption of 
economic tools and education methods can help people to recognize the real worth of 
water and to increase the awareness of water conservation, thereby promoting further 
voluntary water-saving practices. 
• Water demand management can increase the resilience of human society and ecosystems. 
There is clear evidence that climate change has strong impacts on water systems, such as 
increasing uncertainties of water availability and high risks of droughts and floods (Bates 
et al., 2008), and affects almost every sector of human society including agriculture, 
industry, transport, energy, and recreation (Olmstead, 2014). People’s behavioral changes 
towards water use would further affect the reliability and security of water systems. Being 
able to accomplish the same task with less water results in less risk of water cut-offs or 
shortages during drought periods. Having more water preserved in ecological systems also 
increases their adaptability to extreme situations, which is essentially beneficial to human 
society as a whole. 
• It can support the sustainable development of water resources. The preserved water not 
only can be used for waste assimilation and increasing system resilience, but also can be 
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utilized for beneficial purposes by future generations. Moreover, less water usage by 
human society could induce less energy consumption and lower greenhouse gas 
emissions, which are also important contributions to the sustainability of human society.  
Overall, the implementation of water demand management has a myriad of benefits, 
exceeding those mentioned above. However, there are also many barriers hindering the widespread 
adoption of water demand management initiatives.  
• Many water authorities or agencies do not have official and clear guidelines for the 
implementation of water demand management, such as what goals and objectives should 
be achieved, what programs should be implemented, and what related issues about 
legislation should be addressed in a specific region. Without appropriate guidelines, 
managers and users are unaware or unable to make effective investments in water demand 
management programs. For example, clear standards regarding low-flush toilets for 
mandatory installation in new buildings and retrofitting programs in old buildings could 
significantly enhance water conservation objectives.  
• The lack of knowledge and information is also one of the key barriers from the viewpoint 
of water users. They may know that water, especially clean drinking water, is valuable, 
but not fully realize how precious it is. Many users take for granted the availability of an 
abundance of clean water supplied at a reasonable price, and thus think nothing of using 
drinking water to wash cars or irrigate gardens. Knowledge of the real value or cost of 
water by users increases their awareness of water conservation. Public participation plays 
a significant role in the successful implementation of water demand management 
programs.  
• The absence of incentives for users discourages them from taking the needed actions. 
People tend to be reactive in their habits, whether because of apathy or laziness or 
reluctance to accept new technologies. Even though consumers know that installing low-
flush toilets can save water and reduce their water bills, many of them would not take the 
necessary actions if they bear all the costs of replacing old toilets. Providing rebates or 
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subsidies to users could accelerate the adoption rate of new advanced technologies and 
thereby achieve better water demand management.  
• There often exist conflicting objectives during the implementation of water demand 
management initiatives. For example, a policy aimed at reducing water use in irrigation 
for utilization for other purposes like increasing environment flows, is beneficial from a 
resources management perspective in the long term. However, the irrigator may suffer 
revenue losses because of crop production reductions, and thus be against the policy. In 
many cases, a large portion of the benefits garnered by water demand management, like 
deferring new water supply projects and enhanced ecosystem services, will not be 
immediately apparent or are intangible, but the costs would be generally noticeable. It is 
of great importance to take into account all of the potential costs and benefits, financial 
support, and public acceptability in the evaluation process.   
Many other barriers can be identified for specific cases, such as the lack of effective 
communication mechanisms among management departments. To overcome these major or minor 
barriers, significantly more research is required.       
 
1.2 Problem Statements 
Municipal and industrial water demand are inexorably increasing because of population growth 
and economic development. According to a report published by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), global water demand for water is expected to increase by 
55% between 2000 and 2050, and water demand for manufacturing, electricity, and domestic 
purposes during the same time period are projected to increase by 400%, 144%, and 127%, 
respectively (Leflaive et al., 2012). Given that the absolute volume of urban demand is difficult to 
reduce without compromising the current quality of life, the key goal for the urban sector is to 
improve water use efficiency and promote water recycling.  
The OECD report also indicated that 60% more food will need to be produced from irrigation 
in order to feed 9.7 billion people in 2050 (Leflaive et al., 2012; UNDESA, 2015). However, the 
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water availability for irrigation purposes in 2050 will be reduced by 14% in comparison to the 
2000 level. With the impacts of climate change, this availability may be even more uncertain. This 
emphasizes the urgent need for agriculture to use water more efficiently and productively.  
This prediction points out one possible direction for solving water problems: encouraging 
water conservation in the irrigation sector and transferring the conserved water to the urban sector, 
with the urban sector providing adequate compensation to the irrigation sector such that the costs 
of water conservation can be fully or more than covered. Since irrigation is the largest water user, 
even a small amount of water conservation in irrigation may provide enough water for urban 
purposes and possibly also for environmental requirements. 
With respect to water conservation in the irrigation sector, there is already ample scientific 
findings and practical experience available on the technical side. However, many investigations 
suggest that water conservation is more an issue of perception than of technology. In fact, the 
technological limitation for water demand management is modest while the conservation potential 
is significant (Mass, 2003; Blanke et al., 2007). The question is how do people regard water 
conservation, and do they have enough motivation to take advantage of these existing 
technologies?  
As mentioned above, people normally do not voluntarily adopt advanced water-saving 
technologies. Sometimes external incentives are required to entice users to change their water use 
behavior, especially for users in sectors that possess great potential for water conservation. It is 
believed that every user has the capability to enhance his or her water use efficiency as long as 
proper incentives are offered. The problems of what incentives are needed, where do incentives 
come from, and how water users respond to the incentives under the context of water demand 
management need to be investigated. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
The overall objective of this research is to investigate the hydrologic and economic impacts of 
water demand management through water transfers among users and how to encourage water users 
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to utilize water wisely by offering appropriate incentives. More specifically, various 
methodologies are developed based on two underlying principles: either to increase aggregated 
benefits given the currently available water or to decrease aggregated water consumption while 
achieving benefits that are no less than the current ones. Potential maximum benefits under the 
scenarios having water demand management are estimated using centralized and decentralized 
optimization techniques, and compensation values are determined to encourage water 
conservation. Minimum water requirements under different scenarios of conservation limits are 
assessed.    
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters, as shown in Figure 1.1. The thesis begins with a general 
introduction in Chapter 1 stressing the importance and unique advantages of water demand 
management, and pointing out some key barriers to the widespread adoption of water demand 
management. The research problem and objectives are then described in this chapter. Chapter 2 
reviews several aspects of water demand management starting from the classification of water 
demands and key characteristics of consumptive uses. The motivation, definitions, various 
measures, and potential costs and benefits of water demand management are discussed in depth. 
Water demand management at the basin level is a part of the water allocation problem, and 
objectives, approaches of water allocation are examined. Chapter 3 briefly reviews two initial 
water allocation methods and provides an example to show how the two methods work. Initial 
water allocation results obtained by using the methods constitute a baseline scenario in various 
water demand management methodologies in the following chapters.  
Based on the first specified principle given on the left side in Figure 1.1, Chapter 4 describes 
how to incorporate a specified water demand management plan into a cooperative water allocation 
model to achieve better aggregated benefits, and then how to fairly share the additional benefits 
through a modified cooperative reallocation game. The economic impacts of the plan are evaluated 
using an illustrative case study. In Chapter 5, an agent-based model for water demand management 
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based on the first principle is proposed to investigate the responses of different users in order to 
obtain individual maximum benefits and their impacts on the overall system. The same illustrative 
case study is utilized to test the new agent-based model. 
Founded on the second principle, Chapter 6 puts forward two versions of a hydrologic-
economic model to estimate the minimum water requirements to achieve at least the same level of 
benefit with various conservation limits consideration, as indicated on the right side of Figure 1.1. 
The model is applied to the South Saskatchewan River Basin. Chapter 7 summarizes the main 
contributions of this study, and lists some recommended future work, shown at the bottom of 
Figure 1.1.    
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Perspectives on Water Demand Management 
The classification of water demand and the key characteristics of consumptive uses are firstly 
described in this chapter. How to manage the demand considering their different characteristics is 
a core question for water demand management. Two fundamental motivations, various definitions, 
a series of applicable measures, and the potential costs and benefits of water demand management 
are discussed in the second part. Lastly, water demand management at the basin level is an 
important part of water allocation. Hence, the objectives and approaches of water allocation at the 
basin level are reviewed. 
 
2.1 Water Demand 
Water is needed for various purposes by humanity. Firstly, people need drinking water for survival. 
Secondly, economic development requires water as one of its key inputs in order to satisfy people’s 
various needs for goods and services. Thirdly, many water-related recreational activities are 
necessary for improvement in the quality of life. Last, but not least, ecosystem protection is crucial 
for the long-term evolution of human society. The need for water for a specified purpose is 
commonly referred to as water demand or water use. These two terminologies are utilized 
synonymously in this dissertation.  
 
2.1.1 Classification of Water Demand 
Based on different criteria, water uses can be categorized into various groups. For instance, 
according to the purpose of water use, there are residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, 
hydropower, recreational, and environmental uses. Depending on their impacts on hydrologic 
cycle, water uses are classified into two main categories: consumptive and non-consumptive uses. 
Consumptive use refers to “water that is unavailable for reuse in the basin from which it was 
extracted due to evaporation, incorporation into plant biomass, transfer to another basin, seepage 
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to a saline sink, or contamination” (Gleick et al., 2011). Consumptive use typically causes 
diminishment to water in quantity and/or quality, and thereby water availability is adversely 
affected. Non-consumptive use, on the other hand, means either no diversion from the water source, 
or water diversion is immediately returned to the source following its use in the same quantity and 
quality, such as hydropower generation, navigation, and recreational activities. A hierarchical 
classification of water uses in a basin is given in Table 2.1. In this table, consumptive use is 
indicated by “C”, and non-consumptive use is marked by “NC”. 
It should be noted that consumptive and non-consumptive uses are not completely exclusive 
to each other. This is because consumptive use typically is not one hundred percent efficient, and 
there are always some return flows in the form of either surface runoff or groundwater recharge. 
For a non-consumptive use like storing water in a reservoir, there are always evaporation losses 
while maintaining the reservoir at a particular water depth. The evaporation losses of the reservoir 
are excluded from consumptive uses because this part of the water losses would normally transfer 
into clouds in the atmosphere, and subsequently fall to the ground in the form of rain or snow. 
  
2.1.1.1 Consumptive Uses 
As indicated in Table 2.1, municipal, industrial and agricultural uses are three main types of 
consumptive uses. Among these three major consumptive uses, municipal and industrial uses are 
commonly combined into one use named urban use. These sector-level consumptive uses can be 
further divided into individual level uses or be aggregated to the basin level and national level 








Table 2.1 Hierarchical classification of water uses (based on Gupta (2016)) 





Use for cooking, washing, watering lawns, and 
air conditioning 
Public Use in public facilities and for fire-fighting 
Commercial Use in shopping centers, hotels, and laundries 
Small industries Use for industrial production 
Conveyance loss — 
Industrial uses (C) 
Use for large water-using industries such as steel, 
paper, chemicals, textiles and petroleum refining 
Water dilution (NC) 




Irrigation Use for raising crops 
Factory farm uses Use for livestock 
Conveyance losses and waste — 
Hydropower 
use (NC) 




Water release from upstream reservoirs to raise 
water depth 
Lock-and-dam 
Increase water depth for navigation through ship 
locks and dams 
Artificial canalization 
Use for artificially constructed channels with a 
number of ship locks 
Other uses 
Flood storage (NC) Control floods 
Recreation (NC) 
Provide a place for swimming, fishing and other 
recreational activities 
Water export (C) 
Large diversion and export for commercial 
purposes 
Ecological uses (C & NC) 
Conservation of endangered aquatic life, use for 
forestry, filling wetlands, etc. 
 




Municipal water use generally refers to water used for residential, commercial, public 
facilities, and some small industries not having a separate water supply system in a city. Residential 
use, also called household or domestic use, includes indoor appliances like toilets, showers, 
cooking facilities, and cloth washing machines, as well as outdoor activities such as landscape 
irrigation and car washing. The demand for water in this sector depends on several determinants 
like the number and density of population, income level, climate conditions, and cost of water 
supply (Baumann et al., 1997; Arbues et al., 2003). A simple equation to estimate municipal water 
demand is using population multiplied by per capita water usage. The per capita use differs from 
city to city. A survey in the United States indicated that in 2010 residential per capita use ranged 
between 51 and 167 gallons per day with a national average of 88 gallons per day (Maupin et al., 
2014), while in Canada the average in 2011 was 66 gallons per day (Statistics Canada, 2013). In 
addition, the residential per capita water use shows a declining trend over the past few decades as 
a result of an increased availability of water-saving appliances and changes in water use behavior, 










































Figure 2.2 Residential per capita water use in Canada 
 
Industrial use mainly includes thermoelectricity power plants and large water-consuming 
manufacturers, such as steel, paper, chemicals, textiles, and petroleum refining. Industrial use is 
affected by factors like types of production, technology used in processing. For example, oil sands 
production requires a large quantity of water (Xiao et al., 2015b), but specific requirements vary 
depending on the technologies utilized. By mining technology, about 3.1 barrels of water are 
required for each barrel of bitumen produced, while only 0.4 barrel of water is needed when in-
situ technology is adopted (Kuang et al., 2014). The typical average water use of major industries 
are listed in Table 2.2. As can be seen in the table, average water use varies substantially by 
industry. A downward trend similar to municipal use is also observed for many industries. Figure 
2.3 provides an example of the magnitude of each municipal and industrial use in a typical 
medium-size city. Of course, the percentages may be different according to various conditions of 






























Data Source: Environment Canada's Municipal Water and Wastewater Survey & 
Statistics Canada's Survey of Drinking Water Plants 
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Table 2.2 Average water use of major industries (based on Gupta (2016), p.20) 
Industry Average Water Use 
Thermoelectric power plants 19 gallons/kWh 
Steel 62,000 gallons/ton 
Paper 39,000 gallons/ton 
Chemicals 55,000 gallons/ton 
Woolens 140,000 gallons/ton 
Petroleum refining 1,850 gallon/barrel 
1 gallon = 3.785 litres 
 
In agriculture, water use includes the need for water for raising crops (irrigation) and for 
breeding livestock (factory-farm). Irrigation is the dominant use in this sector, and also the heaviest 
use in a basin in most cases. Several factors could have impacts on irrigation water use, such as 
crop patterns, irrigation methods, soil and climatic conditions. Based on crop evapotranspiration 
and crop coefficient, one can determine the volume of water needed to be withdrawn from a river 
after the exclusion of effective rainfall. Livestock water use can be calculated by using the simple 
equation mentioned above: number of livestock multiplied by per capita water use. More details 
regarding characteristics of consumptive uses are discussed in Section 2.1.2. 
 
2.1.1.2 Non-Consumptive Uses 
Non-consumptive uses normally take place on-site and do not abstract water from water source. 
These uses may not provide substantial economic benefits, but still provide significant value for 
human society. The main types of non-consumptive uses include hydropower, navigation, 





Figure 2.3 Water uses in a medium-size city (based on Gupta (2016), p.4) 
 
Hydropower plants are normally attached to reservoirs or dams because they require a 
considerable size of water head and water flow to convert streamflow to electrical power. The 
economic evaluation of hydropower use is calculated by the amount of electrical power generated 
multiplied by the difference between electricity price and cost per unit of power. Hydropower is 
considered much cleaner and more sustainable than thermoelectricity power, but the construction 
of reservoirs or dams may cause conflicts between upstream and downstream users because it 
changes the water availability for downstream users. 
Navigation in a river requires a minimum level of water depth depending on the size of the 
river and velocity of flow. This minimum requirement is roughly constant throughout the river and 
across seasons. For the situations in which the natural water depth at some sections of a river or 
Household (40%)
Commercial (13%)

























some periods of a year is not sufficient for navigation purpose, some corrective actions are needed. 
For instance, water depth can be raised by water releases from upstream reservoirs, or by a series 
of dams and ship locks. When two different river systems need to be connected, new channels with 
a number of ship locks can be constructed to satisfy the needs of navigation.  
From the environmental perspective, a certain amount of water needs to be preserved in a 
river for aquatic system protection and sewage purification purposes. In the past, raw waste from 
municipality and industry were directly discharged into the rivers without treatment. For this case, 
at least 40 times the amount of streamflow to wasteflow is often required to sufficiently dilute 
unsafe materials in the river system (Gupta, 2016). Even though nowadays direct dumping of raw 
waste is not allowed and waste treatment is normally performed before discharging waste into the 
rivers, there is still the need for an adequate level of streamflow. This is because the absolute 
volume of waste is significantly increasing due to the rapid pace of urbanization and 
industrialization, and also the distances between cities are shorter. In addition, forestry and wetland 
retain a sizable amount of water to maintain wildlife habitat. The evaluation of water for meeting 
environmental goals requires utilizing approaches such as the travel cost method and contingent 
valuation technique (Brown et al., 1991; Venkatachalam, 2004; Fleming and Cook, 2008). For 
modeling purposes, navigation water use and environmental use can typically be combined and 
implemented as a minimum flow requirement. 
  
2.1.2 Key Characteristics of Consumptive Uses 
The main typical consumptive uses possess distinguishable characteristics in terms of total 
demand, consumption ratio, sensitivity to price changes, productivity and seasonality. A better 
understanding of their diversified characteristics may provide greater opportunities for better 
managing these uses.  
With respect to total water demand, agricultural demand is the largest globally whereas 
demand in the municipal and industrial sectors is increasing significantly (Shiklomanov, 2000). 
Almost 70% of the extracted fresh water is utilized for crop-raising activities globally (FAO, 
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2013), and more water is required in order to produce more food in the future. It is believed that if 
water is utilized effectively in agriculture, water will not be a bottleneck for future food production 
(De Fraiture and Wichelns, 2010). The demand for municipal and industrial uses is expected to 
increase rapidly in the near future due to burgeoning urbanization and industrialization. More 
specifically, the increases between 2000 and 2050 will mainly come from manufacturing (400%), 
electricity (144%), and domestic uses (127%) (Leflaive et al., 2012), as shown in Figure 2.4. 
Because of agriculture’s large share in total water demand, a small contribution from agriculture 
may provide a substantial amount of water for other uses. A study in southern Alberta indicated 
that a 4.6% improvement in irrigation efficiency could conserve enough water to cover the annual 
demand of all municipalities in the basin (AIPA, 2010). Accordingly, agriculture is believed to 
have the most significant potential to free-up water for other uses. 
 
Figure 2.4 Global water demand in 2000 and 2050 
 (Note: BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa); OECD (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development); RoW (rest of the world). This graph only measures 
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Moreover, agriculture is also the largest water consumer in most regions, since it absorbs a 
majority of the water it takes. For instance, agriculture in Canada accounted for only five percent 
of total water withdrawal in 2013, but was still the largest water consumer (ECCC, 2017a). In 
contrast, most water withdrawn by municipal and industrial uses are returned to the water body, 
which means water consumed is much less than the water taken by them. It is reported that less 
than 10% of global water consumption comes from municipal and industrial sectors (Richter et al., 
2013). Consequently, agriculture should be the first sector investigated in order to reduce overall 
water consumption in a region.  
Because water is a scarce resource, economic instruments, such as pricing measures, are 
introduced for managing water demand like an economic good (Winpenny, 1994). Many studies 
have been conducted on estimating the price elasticity of water demand for the municipal, 
industrial (Arbués et al., 2003; Olmstead and Stavins, 2009) and agricultural sectors (Scheierling 
et al., 2006). Empirical studies suggest that elasticity in the municipal sector is relatively low, with 
an average value of -0.51, and normally varies from case to case (Espey et al., 1997). Industrial 
use is inelastic as well, with an average elasticity of -0.29 and ranging from -0.79 to -0.1, according 
to an investigation of 51 industrial plants in France (Reynaud, 2003). Agriculture water usage is 
also not very sensitive to price changes, with a mean value of price elasticity of -0.48 (Scheierling 
et al., 2006). With increasing competition for water, price signals play an important role in water 
demand management, but need to be evaluated carefully according to specific conditions in 
different cases.  
Value of water utilization also varies from sector to sector. How much benefit can be 
generated by one user can be estimated by using statistical methods and optimization models. 
Benefit functions constitute an appropriate form to indicate the relationship between water 
consumption levels and benefits generation. The benefit functions can be represented by different 
structures like linear, quadratic, or inverse price-demand forms (Wang et al.,2008a, b). With 
respect to the benefits produced per unit of water, municipal and industrial uses generally perform 
better than agriculture uses. Consequently, many studies on efficient use of water resources suggest 
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water transfer from low-value to high-value ones (Booker and Young, 1994; Mahan et al., 2002, 
Wang et al.,2008b). 
Another important feature of consumptive use is its seasonality. Specifically, agriculture 
normally requires a sizable amount of water during the crop growing season, and much less water 
during the other months of the year; while municipal and industrial demand is generally evenly 
distributed throughout the year. 
 
2.2 Water Demand Management 
Water demand management is widely considered as a promising path towards the sustainable 
development of water resources (Tate, 1989; Gleick, 2003a; Brooks, 2006; Butler and Memon, 
2006). During the past few decades, water management has witnessed a gradual shift from supply 
management towards demand management. The motivation, definitions, measures, and potential 
costs and benefits of water demand management are reviewed in this section.   
 
2.2.1 Motivation for Water Demand Management 
The development of water management techniques has gone hand-in-hand with the evolution of 
human societies, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Two fundamental motivations are identified for the 
development of water demand management approaches.  
The first motivation is the growing conflicts, in terms of both frequency and severity, caused 
by water scarcity. Earlier in human society, when the population was much smaller, all water needs 
could be satisfied because there was sufficient available water. As water demand has increased 
due to population growth and urban development in modern times, various supply-oriented 
practical efforts, such as expanding the construction of water infrastructure, have been made by 
water managers over the past century in order to increase water supply to meet the exponentially 
growing water demand, as shown in the middle part of Figure 2.5. These efforts have effectively 
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alleviated water stresses facing humanity, and have provided massive benefits in terms of greater 
economic returns and fewer water-related disasters.  
However, the methods to increase water supply are becoming much less viable as the marginal 
costs tend to be much more expensive economically, politically, and environmentally. The future 
demand will hardly be satisfied if the demand continues its exponential growth. In addition, with 
an increasing awareness of environmental conservation, the water availability for human use will 
be further restrained, as indicated by the dotted line of sustainable water available in Figure 2.5. 
Sharing of water among increasingly competing activities is becoming more challenging. Many 
water conflicts have arisen due to the imbalance between water supply and water demand (Wolf, 
2002; Gleick and Heberger, 2014), and the situation can be aggravated if the imbalance cannot be 
managed properly. 
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The second fundamental motivation for the development of water demand management 
approaches arises from the rethinking of the real purpose of water resources. Water has 
traditionally been viewed as an indispensable resource for activities like crop production and urban 
development. These activities compete for limited water resources. However, the essential purpose 
of water use is to produce a range of products and services to satisfy people’s needs. As explained 
by Gleick et al. (2011), “people want to satisfy demands for goods and services, such as food, 
fiber, waste disposal, they may not care how much water is used - or even whether water is used 
at all - as long as these goods and services are produced in convenient, cost-effective, and socially 
acceptable ways”. 
A particular example is that about 100 to 200 tons of water was needed to produce a ton of 
steel in the 1920s, while less than four tons of water is required for each ton of steel produced 
nowadays (Gleick, 2003b). This example demonstrates the great potential for water demand 
management. A world water development report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (WWAP, 2015) also indicates that the water crisis is not a problem of water 
resources itself, but rather a problem of water governance, and requires initiatives and cooperation 
from both the public and private sectors. 
It should be noted that water demand management should be considered as being a valuable 
complement to, rather than a replacement of, traditional water supply management, because new 
water supply infrastructure will continue to be constructed if necessary, and there is ongoing 
research on desalination and recycling wastewater as new sources of water supply (Sahin et al., 
2015; Ziolkowska, 2015). There is no definitive line between the two techniques; on the contrary, 
an overlap can be found between the two approaches. For example, is collecting rainwater for 
household use a supply or a demand management technique? It is hard to find a definitive answer 
to this question. Another illustration is that the reuse and recycling of water by individual users is 
normally viewed as a demand management technique; however, when it is conducted by a factory 
or company for the purpose of sale or transfer, it becomes a supply management technique. The 
two techniques - water demand management and water supply management - share the same 
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purpose, which is to satisfy people’s needs for products and services; consequently, both 
approaches are important components within an integrated water management framework. 
 
2.2.2 Definitions of Water Demand Management 
Demand management was initially developed in the field of energy management in the 1970s when 
an energy crisis appeared, and particular attention was paid to the customer’s side. The idea of 
demand management emerged from debates among social scientists and analysts (Lovins, 1977; 
Gellings and Chamberlin, 1987). Since then, research on energy demand management has greatly 
flourished, and tremendous benefits have been gained, in terms of significant drops in energy 
demand and continually growing economic returns, from the successful application of energy 
demand management.   
Water and energy share many similar characteristics: both are finite, both are used to satisfy 
human beings' various needs in daily life, and both resources have dramatically increasing 
demands. The idea of demand management in energy management is naturally extended to the 
area of water resources. However, there are also many differences between water management and 
energy management: energy is treated as an economic good while water is not; energy use can be 
metered more accurately than water use; and energy pricing system is considerably well-
established while water pricing system is not. Many efforts are still required in the field of water 
demand management. Water demand management is a relatively new concept and still not 
completely definitive; consequently, a number of definitions can be found in the literature.  
Tate (1989) defined water demand management as “any socially beneficial measure which 
reduces or reschedules average or peak water withdrawals or consumptive use from surface or 
groundwater, while maintaining or mitigating the extent to which return flows are degraded”. The 
term “socially beneficial” means the benefits produced by the adoption of a particular measure 
should outweigh the cost of adoption. Arlosoroff (1999) reported that demand management is 
“much more aggressive in its use of economics to influence the origin of water demands to provide 
incentives for satisfying given "ends" in the cheapest possible manner”. Renzetti (2002) defined 
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water demand management as being “policies that are meant to contribute to the efficient allocation 
of water through the “management” of water demands”. 
Savenjie and van der Zaag (2002) described demand management as “the development and 
implementation of strategies aimed at influencing demand, so as to achieve efficient and 
sustainable use of a scarce resource”. Brooks (2006) proposed an operational definition of water 
demand management consisting of the following five facets: (1) Reduce the quantity or quality of 
water required to achieve a specific task; (2) Adjust the nature of the task or the process it is 
undertaken so that it can be accomplished with less water or with lower quality water; (3) Reduce 
the loss in quantity or quality of water as it flows from source through conveyance systems and 
use to final disposal;  (4) Shift the timing of use from peak to off-peak periods; and (5) Increase 
the ability of a water system to continue to serve society during times when water is in short supply. 
Because water demand management involves hydrology, economics, legislation, and even 
psychology, whichever definition is adopted, the following facets need to be considered: 
• Water demand management is not an objective but a strategy to achieve other desired 
objectives such as social equity and economic efficiency.  
• Water demand management aims to promote efficiency and productivity of water use, and 
mainly focuses on consumptive uses. 
• Water demand management is concerned with not only technology but also perceptual 
aspects. The technological capacity for water demand management is not a limitation in 
most cases (Mass, 2003; Blanke et al., 2007). The question is how do people think about 
water demand management, and do they have enough motivation to take advantage of 
these existing technologies? 
• Water demand management can be implemented at different scales, like individual, sector, 
basin, and national levels.  
At the basin level, the implementation of water demand management is more concerned with 
influencing water demand such that water is shared and utilized more efficiently and productively, 
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than which specific technology is used. It is assumed that users already have the technical capacity 
to achieve a reasonable level of water conservation, and they will do so if proper incentives are 
provided such that the benefits gained are greater than the costs. 
Water use efficiency is generally defined as the ratio of water consumed to water diverted for 
carrying out an activity (water efficiency = water consumed / water diverted). “Water consumed” 
stands for the amount of water that is unavailable for other activities in the same area in the short 
term, and it is calculated variously for different users. For instance, in irrigation, water consumed 
mainly refers to water depletion due to plant evapotranspiration (Jensen, 2007); and for 
manufacturing it normally implies the portion of water that has been incorporated into products. 
An improvement in water efficiency is achieved when the denominator decreases, such that less 
water is diverted to complete a specific activity by adopting new or advanced technologies or 
management practices. 
However, even with a profound understanding of water balance for a particular activity, there 
are significant difficulties in accurately estimating the amount of water consumed in that process, 
and there commonly exists an underestimation of water efficiency using the classical definition, 
as examined by Seckler et al. (2003). Hence, a new concept called water productivity (WP) was 
proposed (Molden, 1997). This new idea is easier to measure than efficiency and reflects the 
ultimate objective of water utilization: provide goods and services to people. It is defined as the 
ratio of benefits gained from water utilization to the amount of water used to produce those benefits 
(Molden et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2011), as expressed by: 










The numerator, benefits gained from water use, can be expressed by physical outputs, 
economic values, or other feasible measurements; while the denominator, water input, can also 
consider several forms depending on the study objectives under consideration, such as gross/net 
inflow or evapotranspiration (Cai et al., 2011). Based on Equation 2.1, an improvement in water 
productivity can be achieved from two aspects: (1) by increasing benefits produced from water 
utilization given the current available water; and (2) by decreasing water input subject to achieving 
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benefits not less than the current ones. Optimization problems can be formulated according to these 
two aspects: the former one implies maximizing benefits as the main objective subject to the 
constraints of water availability; while the latter indicates minimizing water consumption as the 
primary target constrained by physical requirements and benefit goals.    
   
2.2.3 Measures of Water Demand Management 
A great number of measures can be implemented for water demand management, depending on 
the study perspective, area, and objective. One can examine the potential of certain water saving 
technologies in an individual household, or specific farm, or the potential at the sector level; one 
can also evaluate the impacts of economic instruments on individual users or sectors. Many studies 
categorize water demand management measures into: technological improvements, economic 
instruments, regulatory policies, and educational programs.  
 
2.2.3.1 Technological Improvements 
A variety of technological measures can be taken in order to improve water use efficiency and 
productivity in each sector. The effectiveness of each technology and potential cost have been 
broadly studied.  
In agriculture, Blanke et al. (2007) categorized water saving technologies into three groups: 
traditional, household-based, and community-based, and he estimated the water saving potential 
and the adoption level of these technologies in Northern China. Traditional technologies include 
border irrigation, furrow irrigation, and level fields; household-based technologies mainly consist 
of plastic sheeting, drought resistant crop varieties, retaining stubble/low till, and surface pipes; 
community-based technologies are underground pipes, lined canals, and sprinkler systems. Most 
technologies are able to save around 30% of water use, but their adoption level is quite low even 
though the types and availability of technologies were growing rapidly during the last two decades. 
Other measures like deficit irrigation (Fereres and Soriano, 2007), smart irrigation scheduling 
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(Pereira et al., 2007), and laser leveling (Larson et al., 2016) also show great potential in reducing 
water use. 
In urban areas, relying on water distribution networks for water supply having large leakage 
losses constitutes a significant portion of water demand, and thereby leakage control is one of the 
most important measures to reduce water loss (Foxon et al., 2000; Marunga et al., 2006). The 
adoption of low-flow appliances (like toilets, showerheads, and washing machines) can effectively 
save household water usage (Lee et al., 2011; Carragher et al., 2012; Price et al., 2014). Inman and 
Jeffrey (2006) reported the saving potential of these indoor appliances in several countries. Among 
these appliances, toilet leakage is a major place to investigate for water conservation. Rainwater 
harvesting in regions having high levels of rainfall sometimes can also be an effective measure 
(Zhang et al., 2009; Assayed et al., 2013). In addition, greywater recycling systems could provide 
substantial amount of water to users who do not require the highest quality of water.   
Overall, there exist plenty of currently available technologies. One of the common reasons 
hindering the adoption of the existing technologies is the lack of incentive. On the one hand, some 
technologies may need a great investment in the initial installation. On the other hand, the benefit 
from the adoption of the technology may not be obvious in the short term. Therefore, providing 
subsides or compensation to users could promote an increase in the adoption of existing 
technologies, as pointed in Ward (2014), providing subsidies to reduce financial cost for irrigators 
would help them to convert low-efficiency flood irrigation to high-efficiency drip irrigation 
technology, and offset some of the income losses in the face of a drought. 
 
2.2.3.2 Economic Instruments 
Among all of the economic instruments, price attracted the most attention, especially in the 
municipal sector (Baumann et al. ,1997; Nauges and Whittington, 2010). To what extent a price 
change can influence water usage level, which is called price elasticity, is the focus of research in 
this area. As indicated in Section 2.1.2, a consensus about price is that most consumptive uses are 
price inelastic, and the elasticity varies from place to place according to use type. In other words, 
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price change can affect water use to some extent but may have limited effectiveness in some cases. 
For more comprehensive results on price elasticity, one can refer to the work of Epsey et al. (1997), 
Arbues et al. (2003), Dalhuisen et al. (2003), Worthington and Hoffman (2008) in the residential 
sector, and Scheierling et al. (2006) in the irrigation sector.  
Price structure, particularly in the residential sector, has also been extensively studied 
(Nieswiadomy, 1992; Stevens et al., 1992; Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995; Kulshreshtha, 1996; 
Martins and Fortunato, 2007; Olmstead et al., 2007; Rosenberg, 2009; Monteiro and Roseta‐
Palma, 2011; Ghimire et al., 2015). Whether to adopt a uniform price or block price structure, and 
whether to utilize an average or marginal price, would result in different responses to price 
changes. Increasing-block price structures arguably increase elasticity more than a uniform 
structure does (Kulshreshtha, 1996; Olmstead et al., 2007). As examined by Olmstead et al. (2007), 
price elasticity under an increasing-block rate structure is -0.60 while the value is -0.19 under a 
uniform marginal price. However, there were also studies reporting that price structure may not 
significantly affect price elasticity (Stevens et al., 1992). The effects of average and that of 
marginal prices are also debatable: some studies reported that users react more to average price 
(Nieswiadomy, 1992; Kulshreshtha, 1996), while some others suggested that marginal price has a 
more significant impact on elasticity. This inconsistency may be due to several causes, like 
estimation technique, sample size, weather condition, cultural and historic reasons, and 
demographic factors. While the debate continues, one conclusion that can be drawn is that price 
elasticity is considerably site-dependent, so that the findings in one place may not be suitable for 
adoption in other places.  
In addition, showing price information on water bills (Gaudin, 2006) and bill frequency 
(Stevens et al., 1992; Kulshreshtha, 1996; Fenrick and Getachew, 2012) may also significantly 
affect water users’ reactions in regards to water use. To include price information on bills and to 
increase bill frequencies may enhance user’s responsiveness to price and provide more motivation 
to conserve water.  
Except for the municipal sector, economic instruments in agriculture have also received 
significant attention (Varela-Ortega et al., 1998; Berbel and Gómez-Limón, 2000; Johansson et 
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al., 2002; Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Tsur, 2005; Scheierling et al., 2006; Schoengold et al., 
2006; Ohab-Yazdi and Ahmadi; 2015). As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, price inelasticity is 
observed in this sector as well. A general conclusion is that irrigation water demand needs to be 
priced, but what is the “right” price is debatable. A low price would not be effective in reducing 
irrigation water demand, but an effective price to reduce water demand may significantly affect 
farm income and employment (Berbel and Gómez-Limón, 2000; Huang et al., 2010). Different 
pricing policies in the same area may have distinct impacts on water demand, farmers’ income, 
and governments’ revenue (Varela-Ortega et al., 1998). Therefore, similar to the findings in the 
residential sector, price for irrigation water needs to be considered case by case, and one may not 
rely on experiences from other locations. 
  
2.2.3.3 Regulatory Policies 
Regulatory polices refer to any voluntary or mandatory actions taken by water users or 
administrative agencies to reduce water use. Fielding et al. (2013) estimated the long-term impacts 
of a series of voluntary strategies on urban water demand in Queensland, Australia, through an 
experimental study. The results showed that water consumption could greatly decrease for 
approximately 12 months, but would subsequently return to previous levels. This situation 
indicated that more actions other than voluntary strategies need to be taken to ensure the long-term 
effectiveness of water demand management. Water use restrictions can be temporary or 
permanently imposed to specific or all users in the face of water scarcity, such as restricting 
landscape irrigation during peak evapotranspiration hours (Renwick and Green, 2000). Mandatory 
allocation policies can also serve the purpose of reducing water consumption, but only with careful 
design and implementation. It is believed that mandatory policies perform more effective than 
voluntary methods in regard to water reduction (Renwick and Green, 2000; Maggioni, 2015), but 
the policy design process needs to take into account equity considerations, because the public’s 
support is one of the key factors in determining the successfulness of a given policy. 
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2.2.3.4 Educational Programs 
Educational programs involve the use of printed, audio, and video materials in order to modify 
water use behavior in the long-term. Although their short-term effects might be limited in some 
regions, they are still worthy of investment as a promising approach (Thompson and Stoutemyer, 
1991; Nieswiadomy, 1992; Syme et al., 2000; Lavee et al., 2013). Renwick and Green (2000) 
reported an average 8% reduction can be achieved through public information campaigns in the 
Western USA. The public participation rate is a key factor in the implementation of these 
programs, and sometimes targeted campaigns are employed.  
 
2.2.3.5 Overview of Water Demand Management Measures 
It should be noted that more than one kind of measure can be taken simultaneously. Thus, the 
effectiveness of different measures can be assessed and compared (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009; 
Tsai et al., 2011; Araral and Wang, 2013; Reynaud, 2013), in order to obtain valuable insights 
regarding the implementation of water demand management approaches. Extensive successful 
implementations of water demand management have been reported globally (Kreutzwiser and 
Feagan, 1989; Mwendera et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2005; Sharp, 2006; Brooks and Wolfe, 2007; 
Kenney et al., 2008; Adler, 2011; Zeitoun et al., 2012; Kampragou et al., 2011; Araral and Wang, 
2013; Kishore, 2013; Tortajada and Joshi, 2013; Smith et al., 2015). 
In summary, one finding from the literature review is that many measures are site-specific, 
especially economic instruments. Therefore, they should be adapted to be compatible with specific 
conditions (Sharma and Vairavamoorthy, 2009; Kampragou et al., 2011). The successful 
experiences in developed countries may not be directly applicable to developing countries (Sebri, 
2014).  
Another finding is that some measures may be technically achievable but politically 
infeasible, and public acceptability is of great importance. However, this categorization does not 
take into account the acceptability and participation level of individual users, which may result in 
unexpected outcomes in the implementation. For example, increasing the price of water is regarded 
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as a tool to decrease water usage in households, but some users may use more water because they 
think they paid more for it. Another reason behind this phenomenon is that the water bill is only a 
small fraction of a household budget. Consequently, a different categorization is proposed by 
Mohamed and Savenije (2000), in which each type of water demand management measure is 
categorized according to positive and negative incentives, as well as water quota regulations. 
Positive incentives normally imply benefit being given to water users, like subsidies for adopting 
new technologies, while negative incentives generally mean benefits being taken from users, in 
the form of water prices or taxes. Both positive and negative incentives have their advantages and 
drawbacks, and should be selected according to specific circumstances, or sometimes be 
combined. However, because positive incentives are generally more acceptable to users, the 
participation rates and compliance levels to the water demand management measures are expected 
to be improved, thereby achieving better effectiveness of the measures. As a result, positive 
incentives receive special attention in this research. 
 
2.2.4 Costs and Benefits of Water Demand Management 
As mentioned earlier, positive incentives imply benefit being given to water users. More 
specifically, it means a surplus by subtracting cost from benefit obtained in the implementation of 
a specific water demand management program. To estimate the surplus, an in-depth understanding 
of potential cost and benefit regarding the program is required. Hence, cost-benefit analysis 
constitutes a systematic approach for consideration for employment in water demand management. 
Water demand management costs mainly include implementation and operation costs. The 
implementation costs refer to the expenditures, such as labor, materials, and advertising, which 
occur during the design and evaluation of the implementation plan of a program and during the 
installation of the program. The operation costs mean the expenses required to maintain the full 
effectiveness of the program after its installation, such as the labor costs and economic incentives.  
The benefits of water demand management consist of direct water use and indirect water use 
valuations. Direct valuation involves the value obtained from directly consuming water, like 
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municipal, industrial, and agricultural uses, as well as hydropower electricity values. Indirect 
valuation includes recreational and environmental values provided by water savings from deferred 
construction of new infrastructure, reductions of wastewater treatment expenses resulting from 
less water discharge, and less electricity usage. Smith et al. (2015) also suggest the inclusion of 
the value of system resilience (less risk of water shortage and fire), value of less greenhouse gas 
emissions and energy requirements, value of public awareness (promoting further voluntary water-
saving practices) and worth of good customer relationships. Even though these indirect values are 
intangible and require special estimation techniques, it is important to take these values into 
consideration. 
The aforementioned costs and benefits are mostly of interest to administrative agencies or 
managers, while positive incentives are more related to individual users. An economic incentive 
is regarded as a benefit by the individual user, but may be viewed as a cost for agencies. Therefore, 
it is important to be clear about the point of view taken in a cost-benefit analysis, which is referred 
to as the “accounting perspective” (Baumann et al., 1997).  
Individually, costs can be broken down into equipment investment, installation fee, 
maintenance cost, and sometimes learning expenses. The benefits can be divided into direct 
economic returns from water utilization, incentives from agencies, and indirect benefits such as 
reduced water bills, and sometimes aesthetic value. Note that the direct economic return from 
water utilization may drop due to the reduction in water usage. In this case, a compensation is 
necessary to cover the decline. This is also the key implication of having positive incentives. 
 
2.3 Basin-wide Water Demand Management and Water Allocation 
In the previous sections, water demand management issues at the individual and sector (municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural) levels have been discussed. Most existing studies focused on one 
particular sector to examine the effectiveness of one or more measures. There are extensive 
interactions among these sectors: the change of water demand in one sector may affect the water 
availability to other sectors, whether positively or negatively. In addition, water demand 
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management beyond the sector level could provide more viable options by enabling the integration 
of demand-side and supply-side management for better water management. Therefore, it is of 
significant importance to investigate water demand management issues at the scale of inter-sectors, 
such as at the basin level.  
Only a few studies have considered water demand management beyond one sector. Brinegar 
and Ward (2009) analyzed the basin impact of providing subsidies to agricultural users. Positive 
results are observed, such as more efficient use of water for crops, higher crop production, extra 
land irrigated, and increased basin-wide economic benefits. Sisto (2009) investigated the issue of 
compensating irrigators to free up more water for environmental purposes in the Rio Conchos 
River in Mexico, and estimated the required economic compensation values. Qureshi et al. (2010) 
examined two incentive policies, paying subsidies for water conservation efforts or buying water 
from irrigators in the water market, for increasing environmental flows in the Murray-Darling 
River Basin. They found that the water market method performs better than the subsidies approach 
alone in the basin, in terms of both additional environmental flows and cost savings. Ramires et 
al. (2011) explored the potential of water transfers from irrigators to urban users in the Mafraq 
Basin in Jordan. A sensitive price elasticity provides an economic opportunity for irrigators to 
conserve water and rent the conserved water to urban users.    
At the basin level, water demand management becomes an important component of water 
allocation endeavors (Kindler, 2010), and the focus shifts from estimating future demand towards 
deciding the determinants of future demand and how these determinants can be managed to 
influence future demand. Water allocation is one of the central issues within integrated water 
management. Allocating scarce water resources in an efficient, fair and sustainable manner is one 
of the greatest challenges facing humanity around the globe. 
 
2.3.1 Objectives of Water Allocation 
Water allocation is the combination of actions which enable water users and water uses to take or 
to receive water for beneficial purposes according to a recognized system of rights and priorities 
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(Wang et al., 2003). The overall objective of water allocation is to maximize the benefits of water 
to society. This overall objective can further be divided into three specific goals: social equity, 
economic efficiency, and environmental sustainability.  
 
2.3.1.1 Specific Goals 
Equity means that water is shared in a fair and equitable manner among different users, among 
existing and future users, and between consumptive uses and the environment. Fairness is a 
complex concept perceived diversely by different people, but in general implies Pareto optimality, 
monotonicity, impartiality, consistency, priority, and envy-free (Young, 1994). Depending on the 
choice of these principles, various water allocation models can be formulated for solving different 
fair allocation problems (Wang et al., 2007a; Hipel et al., 2013). For instance, when the principles 
of priority and monotonicity are satisfied, a priority equitable allocation problem is formed (Wang 
et al., 2007a).     
Efficiency means to achieve maximum benefits from water utilization, including both direct 
and indirect benefits. The valuation of water use substantially varies by types of use, and needs to 
be assessed carefully and thoroughly. The valuation of agricultural water use is normally estimated 
by a water-crop production function, and that of municipal and industrial water use can be 
measured as the consumer surplus derived from a demand function for water. However, for water 
use where there is no or little direct market-price measurement, and, hence, other valuation 
methods are needed (Brown et al., 1991; Gregory et al., 1993; Turner et al., 2001; Adamowicz et 
al., 2007; Stahl et al., 2007).  
Sustainability implies that present water utilization should not jeopardize the water 
availability to meet future generations’ needs, according to the most well-known definition made 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 (WCED, 1987). Since then, 
a number of definitions have been proposed based on different understandings and interpretations 
of the concept. How to quantitatively measure this concept is still a challenging task, and requires 
great effort on identifying the long term possible impacts resulting from present water utilization 
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(Loucks and Gladwell, 1999; Loucks, 2000). Several specific requirements should be followed in 
the exercise of water management: guarantee a basic water supply for human health; guarantee a 
basic water need for sustaining the health of the ecosystem; maintain a certain minimum standard 
of water quality; collect and disclose data on water availability, water use, and water quality; and 
involve all affected parties in the water planning process (Mays, 2007). 
The three specific objectives are normally in conflict with each other, and there exist trade-
offs among them. When one objective is dominant over the others, additional objectives are 
normally considered as judgement-based constraints. However, when two or more objectives are 
equally important and non-commensurable, just like the three objectives mentioned above, a single 
optimum decision is extremely difficult to achieve (Haimes et al., 1975). The emphasis of one 
objective may undermine the achievability of other objectives, and that is when trade-offs come 
into effect. For instance, water markets can achieve the most efficient use of water, but may not 
be friendly to the environmental use and marginalized users. Failing to satisfy sustainability 
objectives might cause a new conflict, and the damage or cost of new conflict may be even higher 
than the benefits gained through the efficient use of water. Therefore, producing a widely socially 
acceptable water allocation plan is a process of finding a reasonable balance among these three 
objectives. To achieve multiple objectives simultaneously as much as possible, multiple-step water 
allocation methods are proposed. For instance, in the first step water is allocated following fairness 
principles, and then a second step is performed to achieve more efficient use of water by allowing 
temporary water transfer among users. 
 
2.3.1.2 Transfer and Externalities 
Water transfers among users normally have externalities regarding both physical and economic 
aspects. For example, if an upstream farmer transfers part of his or her water to an industrial user 
located downstream, there will be more streamflow in the section of river between the two users. 
Meanwhile, the farmer would experience a benefit loss due to a reduction in water utilization, 
while the industrial user could produce more benefit with the extra water. In this case, a fair 
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compensation should be given to the farmer. The compensation could be provided by the industrial 
user or water agency. 
 
2.3.2 Approaches of Water Allocation 
Water allocation problems are essentially concerned with how to distribute limited water resources 
among competing activities to achieve the maximum social welfare. As a result, optimization 
methods are frequently utilized in terms of modelling techniques to find an optimal water 
allocation scheme. Many optimization methods have been proposed, including linear 
programming (Takama et al., 1981; Jacobs and Vogel, 1998; Devi et al., 2005; Kucukmehmetoglu 
and Guldmann, 2010), non-linear programming (Cai et al., 2003; Kilic and Anac, 2010; Yang et 
al., 2012; Xu et al., 2013), dynamic programming (Alaya et al., 2003; Luo et al., 2007; 
Jafarzadegan et al., 2014), genetic algorithms (Ahmed and Sarma, 2005; Nicklow et al., 2010), 
and any combination of these techniques (Cai et al., 2001; Reca et al., 2001; Huang et al., 2002; 
Ghahraman and Sepaskhah, 2004; Li et al., 2009). 
One of the deficiencies of optimization techniques is that they assume every stakeholder is 
acting voluntarily to achieve optimal system-wide performance. However, an optimal system-wide 
outcome does not necessarily mean the best outcome for every individual stakeholder; sometimes 
the outcomes for certain stakeholders may be worse. For example, more water allocated to one 
stakeholder means less water for another stakeholder. In these cases, new conflicts might be 
triggered. It is important to provide motivation for every stakeholder, such as obtaining greater (or, 
at least, not any less) economic benefits, in order to achieve the best system performance. 
Because water allocation is a problem involving multiple stakeholders, in which each 
stakeholder has different interests, conflicts usually arise among stakeholders. Negotiations among 
stakeholders are usually required to find a resolution to the conflict. Accordingly, game theory is 
a powerful tool for negotiation in many water management problems, particularly in water 
allocation (Madani, 2010).   
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Non-cooperative game theory, as a major branch of classical game theory, analyzes decision 
makers’ moves and countermoves in a conflict situation, and derives stable outcomes as equilibria. 
This technique is suitable for carrying out a strategic analysis of a conflict in water management 
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 2005; Nandalal et al., 2007; Madani and Hipel, 2011; Hipel et al., 2014; 
Chu et al., 2015).  
Cooperative game theory, on the other hand, which is another main branch of game theory, 
examines how the gains of cooperation can be shared within a coalition, thus making it more 
suitable than non-cooperative game theory for employment in the water allocation domain. 
Cooperative game theory has been successfully applied to many areas within water management 
such as cost allocation of water projects (Young et al., 1982; Dinar et al., 1992; Sechi et al., 2013) 
and waste load allocation (Kilgour et al., 1988; Okada and Mikami, 1992), but possesses limited 
application to water allocation.  
A comprehensive water allocation framework based on cooperative game theory called the 
Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) was proposed by Wang et al. (2008a). In this 
structure, water allocation is carried out in two steps: initial allocation based on existing water 
rights systems or agreements, and cooperative reallocation involving water transfer and benefits 
sharing among water users. The second step is simulated as a cooperative game. Various coalitions 
can be formed, and the aggregated benefits associated with different coalitions can be estimated. 
The solution concepts of cooperative games such as core-based (nucleolus and its variations) 
(Young et al., 1982; Lejano and Davos, 1995; Owen, 1995) and non-core-based (Shapley value) 
(Shapley, 1953) can be utilized to solve the cooperative game. 
 
2.4 Summary 
As water demand is projected to expand in almost every sector, along with a growing awareness 
of the need for ecosystem maintenance and the uncertainties brought about by climate change, the 
competition for limited water will be increasingly intense. Proactive initiatives on the demand side 
are crucially required. Water demand management is playing an increasingly important role as a 
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complement to supply management, and perhaps should be given higher priority over supply 
management in the near future. Although a variety of technologies for water demand management 
are available, how to motivate users to take advantage of these technologies is a key problem. 
Positive incentives have the potential to increase the participation rate and compliance level, 
thereby achieving better effectiveness of water demand management. Nonetheless, the costs and 
benefits in the implementation of water demand management alternatives need to be assessed 
carefully and thoroughly. To consider water demand management at the basin level provides more 





Equitable Initial Water Allocation Approaches 
In this chapter, two main approaches for equitable initial water allocation proposed by Wang et al. 
(2007a) are briefly reviewed. This initial allocation is used as one of the inputs for a second main 
step in which water demand management is taken into account for improving the efficient use of 
water. The basic configuration of a basin-wide allocation model and hydrologic considerations are 
described. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, equity is one of the most important principles but also a 
complex one for scarce resource sharing problems in which multiple stakeholders, each having 
different interests, are involved. Allocating water resources in an equitable manner provides an 
appropriate starting point for the implementation of various further operations such as water 
demand management strategies. The initial allocation results form a baseline scenario for the 
following chapters of water demand management methodologies.  
 
3.1 Water Rights Systems 
Water rights systems are established to define the ownership of water and how it can be distributed, 
utilized, and protected. Various systems are developed in different countries due to specific legal 
systems and historic reasons. Three most widely observed water rights systems are: prior, riparian, 
and public water rights system (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000).  
Under the prior rights system, water is considered as a private property, and is allocated 
according to the principle of “first in time, first in rights”. The first user can use an allocated 
quantity of water for beneficial purposes, and then subsequent users can use the remaining water 
for their beneficial purposes. In periods of water shortages, there is no sharing of shortage among 
users. Moreover, under this system water users may oppose a charge for obtaining water because 
they think water is their own property.  
On the contrary, the public rights system considers water as a public property, and is mainly 
derived from the “civil law” doctrine. Thus, the ownership of water belongs to the state rather than 
individual users, and users only have the right to use water. Water is administratively distributed 
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to users through water permits from the state. In periods of water shortages, the deficit is shared 
among users, and some users may share more than others.    
The riparian rights system is normally derived from the “common law” doctrine. The 
ownership of water is connected to that of lands, and every riparian user can use a reasonable share 
of water as long as other riparian users are also able to obtain a fair share. This system is mainly 
developed in regions with abundant water resources. However, a pure riparian water system may 
cause the “tragedies of the commons” since the term “reasonable share” is hard to define without 
a proper regulatory management. Therefore, a riparian water system is commonly combined with 
various forms of regulation nowadays, and is treated similar to a public right system.    
 
3.2 Initial Water Allocation Approaches 
Initial water rights allocation is carried out in a basin based on its existing water rights systems or 
agreements. Optimization techniques are essentially utilized for initial water allocation. Based on 
the existing water rights systems, two multi-objective optimization methods, called the priority-
based maximal multi-period network flow (PMMNF) approach and the lexicographic minimax 
water shortage ratios (LMWSR) approach, have been designed for initial allocation (Wang et al. 
2007a; 2008a). Sequential and iterative solution algorithms to solve the three types of problems 
have been developed (Wang et al. 2007a), and various solvers in GAMS (GAMS, 2005) can be 
utilized to optimize these programs.  
In the PMMNF method, water is allocated according to priority ranks. More specifically, each 
user is assigned to several priority ranks, and with each priority rank there is a maximum amount 
of water that can be withdrawn. For example, for a household user, half of his or her demand can 
be satisfied by the volume of water having the highest ranked priority, and the rest of the demand 
can be satisfied with the second highest ranked priority. Meanwhile, half of an industrial user’s 
demand can be satisfied with the highest priority, one fourth with the second highest priority, and 
one fourth with the third highest priority. In this method, water is firstly assigned to fully satisfy 
the highest ranked priority of the demand of all users, then the demand with the second highest 
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priority, and so on, until all available water resources are allocated. For the situations in which 
water is not sufficient for satisfying all of the demand with a specific priority rank, water is 
allocated proportionally among all demands.  
PMMNF is a very versatile method in which water users’ priority ranks are the main principle 
for allocating water resources. Therefore, PMMNF is a priority equitable method for initial water 
allocation (Wang et al., 2007b). Water users with low priority will not receive water until water 
users with high priority are fully satisfied. Consequently, some “junior” users may not be able to 
receive any water during water shortage periods. PMMNF is applicable under the prior, riparian, 
and public water rights systems. 
In contrast, LMWSR is designed for sharing water shortages among all users, every water 
user can receive a proportional share of water when water is limited, and the differences of water 
shortage ratios among all users are minimized. However, one may argue that, for example, 
domestic users have a higher degree of dependency on water than agricultural users, and thus need 
to be considered more preferentially. Hence, weight factors are utilized to distinguish the relative 
precedence of users. The LMWSR technique is applicable under the public rights system, and is 
considered as a perfectly equitable method for initial water allocation (Wang et al., 2007b). 
 
3.2.1 Configuration of a Basin-wide Allocation Model 
Water allocation involves an array of physical hydrological infrastructure such as reservoirs, dams, 
demand sites, rivers, and canals. To mathematically model a water allocation problem, all physical 
components can be described within an abstract network. 
Consider a river basin represented by a node-link network G (K, L) where K = {k1, k2, …, k} 
denotes a set of nodes representing physical components, such as reservoirs or demand sites, of 
the river basin, and L = {(k1, k2): k1, k2  K and k1  k2} stands for a water conduit connecting two 
nodes. The overall planning period is defined as T = {1, 2, …, t, …, }. Let Q (k1, k2, t) be the water 
flow from node k1 to node k2 during time period t.  
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In a basin, there are typically various types of water uses, such as agricultural production, 
urban development, and environmental conservation, which must share the available water 
resources. Additionally, reservoirs are an essential part of water management operations as they 
can store water during periods of high flow to avoid flood disasters and release water to satisfy the 
needs of downstream water users during low flow periods. Therefore, the set of nodes can be 
further divided into several subsets according to node types, since different node types have 
different hydrological properties. For example, storage nodes and non-storage nodes should be 
treated differently in water balance equations. Specifically, the subsets include inflow nodes, 
outflow nodes, junction nodes, agriculture nodes, municipality and industry nodes, reservoir 
nodes, hydropower plants, and streamflow requirements. 
 
3.2.2 Hydrologic Considerations for Water Allocation 
In a water allocation problem, some basic hydrological considerations and constraints need to be 
incorporated into the process, mainly consisting of three categories: physical constraints, policy 
restrictions, and system control rules. The physical constraints mainly consist of water balance 
equations and capacity limits. Water balance equations normally are used to describe the flow of 
water in and out of a system, and are generally expressed as (Gupta, 2016, p.40): 
   –   –  –  –  –    0SI GI SO GOP Q Q E Q Q S      (3.1) 
where P is precipitation; QSI and QGI represent inflow from outside of the system through surface 
water and groundwater, respectively; E means water loss by evaporation, including transpiration; 
QSO and QGO stand for outflow from the system in forms of surface water and groundwater, 
respectively; S denotes the change of storage volume in reservoirs or aquifer; and  is a 
discrepancy term. In practice, depending on the purpose of computation, various water balance 








Figure 3.1 Water balance for a general node k 
 
The general form of water balance equation for each node of the network during each period 
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where S(k, t) is the storage volume for storage node (reservoir or aquifer) k  at the end of period t, 
and is equal to zero for non-storage nodes; Q(k1, k, t) means the water flow from node k1 to k 
during period t, while Q(k, k2, t) is the outflow from node k to k2, or is a return flow from node k if 
node k is a consumptive node; Ql(k1, k, t) stands for water loss during transportation, due to 
evaporation, leakage, or seepage, from node k1 to k during period t; Qa(k, t) represents water 
adjustment from local small tributaries to account for precipitation to node k during period t; and 
Qc(k, t) is used to denote the amount of water consumed at node k during period t due to economic 
activities. This equation can be modified accordingly based on the specific type of node for which 
it is describing. For example, for non-storage nodes S is equal to zero, and for non-consumptive 
nodes, Qc can be omitted. 
How much water can be diverted to a demand site is restricted not only by the maximum 
demand of that site but also by the capacity limit of conduits toward that site. Therefore, a capacity 
constraint is expressed as: 
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where QD(k, t) represents the maximum demand of node k during period t; and Qmax(k1, k, t) 
indicates the maximum capacity of a conduit that is used to divert water to node k during period t. 
The smaller value of the demand volume and the sum of capacity of all conduits towards node k 
are the amount of water that can be diverted to that node. 
Capacity limits for storage nodes and links also play an important role. For example, water 
flow in each link towards node k must not exceed the maximum capacity of the link, which can be 
written as: 
1 1 1( , , ) ( , ,       ), ( , )maxQ k k t Q k k t k k L    (3.4) 
or for a storage node k: 
  ( , ) ( , )  ,    maxS k t S k t k RES   (3.5) 
Besides the physical constraints for each node, there are also policy considerations due to 
social-economic or political restrictions. An obvious example is that there is normally a minimum 
flow requirement for links, which can be expressed as: 
1 1 1( , , ) ( , ,       (, , ))minQ k k t Q k t k Lk k   (3.6) 
Another example from the policy point of view is that the demand for node k during period t 
should be firstly provided by local tributaries, as water in local tributaries are typically accessible 
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In an abstract node-link network, a double-direction link or two opposite-direction links 
between two nodes represent that there exists water flow from a source node to a demand site and 
a return flow from that demand site to the source node. The return flow may cause an 
overestimation of water available at that source node during the same time period, because return 
flow only occurs after water is diverted to the demand site. However, water diversion is scheduled 
before a portion of water is returned to the source node. Therefore, return flow from one demand 
site is not available for diversion at that source node during the same time period. Assuming that 
node k is a source node, k1 means a demand site that diverts water from and provides return flow 
to source node k, and k2 stands for any node that has water flow, including return flow, towards 
the source node k, a system control constraint to reflect the exclusion of return flow from the 
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where the right side of the equation indicates that for a time period t, total effective return flow 
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 . Effective flow means water flow excluding water losses 
during transportation. The remaining flow plus local adjustment flow are the total available water 
at source node k during that period. 
 
3.3 Initial Allocation Example 
Without loss of generality, a hypothetical network, as depicted in Figure 3.2, is designed. The 
network has 2 inflow (IN1, IN2), 1 outflow (O1), 2 reservoirs (R1, R2), 2 agricultural (A1, A2), 2 
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domestic (D1, D2), 2 general (G1, G2), 2 industrial (I1, I2), and 2 instream flow requirements (S1, 
S2) demand nodes. The general demand refers to municipal, excluding domestic, demand, such as 
water use in commercial establishments and public infrastructures. The instream flow requirement 
indicates the minimum instream flow needed for the sake of the safety of aquatic ecology and 
recreational purposes. The water allocation problem is designed for a period of 12 months. The 
monthly supply and demand data are adapted from the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) 


















Figure 3.2 The network of the illustrative example 
 
3.3.1 Water Demand and Supply Data 
The monthly water supply, as shown in Table 3.1, consists of inflow, reservoir storage, and local 
adjustments from small tributaries. It should be noted that local adjustments only occurr at 
reservoir, junction, instream flow requirement, and outlet nodes. The water loss coefficient during 
transmission is set to 3% due to evapotranspiration. The return ratio from agriculture is 25%, while 
the return ratios from domestic and general users are 85% and 75%, respectively. Industrial users 
normally have higher return ratios than domestic or general users because of the higher degree of 
adoption of water recycling technologies, and their return ratios are 99.65% and 99.49% for I1 and 
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I2, respectively. The initial reservoir storages are set to 163.29 million m3 and 317.06 million m3 
for R1 and R2, respectively.  
On the demand side, agricultural users require water resources only during the crop growing 
season from May to September, and their water demand is assumed to be zero in other months. 
The demand of municipal and industrial users are evenly distributed throughout the year with small 
variances in each month, as reported in Table 3.2. In addition to the demand for consumptive users, 
there is also a minimum requirement at the outflow node, as shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.1 Monthly water supply consisting of water inflows at two inflow nodes and 
water adjustments resulting from local tributaries (mcm*) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
IN1 0.864 0.773 0.836 1.155 5.005 9.753 8.504 5.960 3.645 2.344 1.288 1.000 
IN2 2.260 1.927 2.098 2.169 7.284 15.611 13.309 8.479 5.221 3.611 2.697 2.460 
J1 0.547 0.415 0.821 1.127 2.843 3.762 3.201 2.772 2.155 0.655 0.580 0.575 
R1 0.271 0.154 0.241 0.322 0.797 1.311 1.326 0.998 0.705 0.282 0.227 0.244 
S1 0.764 0.434 0.679 0.909 2.251 3.702 3.742 2.818 1.990 0.796 0.639 0.688 
J2 1.106 0.839 1.658 2.278 5.747 7.605 6.471 5.604 4.355 1.325 1.172 1.163 
R2 0.325 0.235 0.471 0.636 1.438 1.853 1.536 1.361 1.084 0.375 0.333 0.329 
S2 0.304 0.230 0.455 0.626 1.578 2.088 1.777 1.539 1.196 0.364 0.322 0.319 
O1 4.254 2.443 3.884 5.195 12.625 20.557 20.412 15.414 11.106 4.504 3.628 3.867 
*1 mcm = 1 million cubic meters 
 
Table 3.2 Monthly water demand of consumptive users (mcm) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
A1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.332 38.462 47.352 32.119 17.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.221 147.970 209.984 118.812 38.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 
D1 0.445 0.414 0.445 0.451 0.528 0.577 0.583 0.607 0.552 0.493 0.457 0.475 
D2 11.424 10.109 11.129 11.277 12.887 12.887 15.385 14.942 13.626 11.720 11.129 11.277 
G1 0.420 0.392 0.420 0.426 0.499 0.545 0.550 0.573 0.522 0.466 0.431 0.448 
G2 6.152 5.444 5.993 6.073 6.940 6.940 8.285 8.047 7.338 6.311 5.993 6.073 
I1 8.345 8.345 8.866 9.388 14.812 15.334 15.647 15.647 13.561 13.039 8.345 8.345 




Table 3.3 Monthly minimum outlet flow (mcm) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
O1 8.173 6.093 8.741 12.393 12.393 12.393 12.393 12.393 12.393 11.487 9.007 8.070 
 
3.3.2 Initial Allocation Results 
Under the PMMNF method, the priority ranks of demands are as listed in Table 3.4. Two domestic 
users’ demands are ranked first, and other users’ demands are satisfied with various priority ranks 
ranging from 2 to 6. The available water, including water supply as shown in Table 3.1 and return 
flows from upstream users, is distributed to users with the highest rank by the maximum amount 
of water which can be diverted, and then the second highest, until all available water is allocated. 
In this way, the initial allocation for each user can be obtained. By dividing one’s allocation by his 
or her demand, a satisfactory ratio can be calculated. The results of the satisfactory ratios for users 
are displayed in Figure 3.3.  
As can be seen from Figure 3.3, users A1, D1, and D2 are fully satisfied. This is because the 
demand of D1 and D2 are ranked the highest, and thereby are satisfied first. A1’s demand can be 
fully satisfied with the amount of water provided in the second highest rank. Water shortages are 
observed for all other users in which G2 and I2 suffer the most. This is because water supply in 
the lower tributary of Figure 3.2 is far less than the total demand of users in that tributary. In fact, 
the demand of A2, G2, and I2 with second highest rank cannot be satisfied.   
When the LMWSR approach is utilized, the weight factors of domestic users are set to 20 
while the weight factors of all other users are set to 10. With the same water supply and demand 
data, initial water allocation for each user can be determined. The same method is employed to 
calculate each user’s satisfactory ratio, for which the results are plotted in Figure 3.4. As can be 
seen from this figure, water shortages are shared among all users. However, the users in the lower 
tributary of Figure 3.2 possess lower satisfactory ratios than the same type of user in the upper 
tributary. The users of A2, G2, and I2 have the same shortage ratio. This implies that the 




Table 3.4 Priority ranks of consumptive users and annual withdrawal limits for 
PMMNF 








D1 6.027 1 6.027 


























































































Two main initial allocation approaches based on existing water rights systems are reviewed in this 
chapter. An illustrative example is utilized to show how these two methods work. The initial 
allocation results form a baseline scenario used in the following chapters in which water demand 
management strategies are implemented. Because the initial allocation indicates the actual amount 
of water under one’s control with a given water availability, further operations based on this result 





Water Demand Management within the Cooperative Water Allocation 
Model 
The impact of a water demand management plan on a water system and its users is investigated 
within a comprehensive cooperative water allocation framework in this chapter. In particular, a 
demand management plan is incorporated into a two-step multi-period fair water allocation model. 
A modified cooperative game is designed for the sharing of additional net benefits under the 
scenario having water demand management. The results indicate that cooperation among water 
users can yield more net benefits, and a water demand management plan is able to lead to a further 
increase of the aggregated net benefits by means of water transfers from less productive users to 
more productive ones. By utilizing the modified cooperative game, fair sharing of additional net 
benefits ensures that every water user can expect to receive more net benefits and thereby water 
users are motivated by incentives to implement a water demand management plan which in turn 
improves water use efficiency. The results in this chapter are based on the findings of Xiao et al. 
(2016).  
 
4.1 Cooperative Water Allocation Model 
Conflicts among water users always exist in water resources allocation because each water user 
has its own interests, and these interests normally conflict with one another. Optimization 
approaches alone may not be able to provide an adequate solution to the conflict. The combination 
of optimization techniques and game theory could provide a proper path for better conflict 
resolution in assisting water policy makers and water managers. In this section, a comprehensive 
water allocation framework at the basin level called the Cooperative Water Allocation Model 
(CWAM), proposed by Wang et al. (2008a), will be described and then the water demand 
management plan will be incorporated into the CWAM. 
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The objective of the CWAM is to allocate limited water resources in an equitable, efficient, 
and environmentally sustainable manner. It involves two main steps: initial water allocation using 
priority-based or lexicographic techniques, as described in Chapter 3, and fair reallocation of net 
benefits (represented in monetary terms) using cooperative game theoretic approaches.  
 
4.1.1 Basin-wide Optimization Model and Net Benefits Functions 
Initial water allocation results are considered as inputs to the Hydrologic-Economic River Basin 
Model (HERBM), along with other inputs such as water demand and benefit functions of all types 
of uses, the set of stakeholders, coalitions and ownership. The purpose of the model is to estimate 
the net benefits of various coalitions and search for the water allocation schemes with the 






  (4.1) 
where NBkt represents the net benefits for demand site k during period t; and Ω is the feasible 
solution space subject to hydrologic and economic constraints. The net benefits function for 
agricultural (AGR) use is represented by a quadratic function form, while the net benefits function 
for municipal and industrial (MI) use can be derived from a water price-demand function with 
constant price-elasticity and choke price. 
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Q(k, t)  is the total inflow to demand site k during period t (m3),  
Cz(k, t)  is the concentration of pollutant z in the total inflow to demand site k during period t, 
wc(k, t)  is the water supply cost to demand site k during period t ($/m3), 
b0 to b5z are coefficients derived from a regresion model. 
The price-demand function with constant price-elasticity and choke price for MI use is shown 
as: 
0 0
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P(k, t)  is the price of willingness to pay to retrieve water ($/m3), 
P0(k, t) is the choke price of the price-demand function ($/m3), 
Q0(k, t) is the choke quantity of the price-demand function (m3), 
α(k, t) and β(k, t)  are scale parameter and price elasticity for the water price-demand function, 
respectively (α(k, t)>0, β(k, t)<0).   
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4.1.2 Cooperative Reallocation Game 
When the net benefits for different coalitions are obtained, they serve as the input of the 
Cooperative Reallocation Game (CRG). In a cooperative game, let N = {1, 2, ..., j, …, n} be the 
set of stakeholders, and a group of stakeholders working cooperatively is called a coalition and is 
denoted by S. Each individual stakeholder can be considered as a coalition which contains the 
individual stakeholder only, while the coalition that contains all stakeholders is called the grand 
coalition.  
     The reallocation of net benefits is viewed as a cooperative game (N, v), in which N is the set 
of stakeholders and v is the characteristic function on N. The notation v(S) represents the maximum 
aggregated benefits produced by the members of coalition S through internal cooperation, and is 
calculated by:    
( ) :jt
j t
v S max NB j S   (4.5) 
Accordingly, the benefits of individual stakeholders and the grand coalition can be expressed as 
v({1}), v({2}), …, v({n}), and v(N), respectively. 
The benefits gained by stakeholders after the reallocation are denoted by a vector x = (x1, x2, 
…, xn ). The vector is called an imputation or a solution to a cooperative game. The term xj - v({j}) 
represents the additional benefits that can be gained from participating in a coalition (also called 
participation value) for stakeholder j. The imputation must satisfy the conditions of individual 
rationality, group rationality, and joint efficiency (Young et al. 1982; Tisdell and Harrison 1992): 
Individual rationality:  
      {  }jx v j j N    (4.6) 
Group rationality:  
       2j
j S
x v S S

   (4.7) 
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  (4.8) 
The individual and group rationality conditions ensure that the benefits of a stakeholder or a 
coalition after reallocation will be no less than the benefits gained by acting on its own. The joint 
efficiency condition ensures that the solution is feasible for the grand coalition, and the benefits 
are shared among coalition members as much as possible.    
Various solution concepts such as core-based (nucleolus and its variations) (Young et al. 
1982; Lejano and Davos 1995; Owen 1995) and non-core-based (Shapley value) (Shapley 1953) 
concepts are utilized for solving the cooperative game in the CWAM (Wang et al. 2003). Since 
the computational complexity of solving a cooperative game can be exponentially high with an 
increase of stakeholder numbers, simplification is necessary to reduce the computational load to a 
reasonable level; thus, it is useful to classify some individual stakeholders into stakeholder groups 
based on their types (Wang et al. 2008a).  
The water allocation schemes and benefits sharing solutions generated by these solution 
concepts can be used to facilitate better water allocation decision-making. However, the 
framework does not provide a mechanism to encourage water users to improve their water use 
efficiency and conserve water resources. Facing the expanding gap between water supply and 
demand, fair water allocation alone is not sufficient for future scenarios, and more efforts on the 
demand side need to be made. Therefore, a demand management plan is specified and incorporated 
into the CWAM framework, and its associated impacts are assessed. 
 
4.2 Incorporation of Water Demand Management 
4.2.1 Water Demand Management Plans 
The basic idea of a water demand management plan is that every water user has the potential to 
improve its water use efficiency, such that certain tasks can be carried out with less water. For 
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instance, less water is needed to irrigate a farm with a drip system or sprinkler technology 
compared to flood irrigation. Since water use can be reduced while the same level of outputs be 
maintained, the water demand of each user or user group can be adjusted by a different factor 
according to its capacities for adjustment, as well as the socioeconomic consequences arising from 
the changes (Xiao et al., 2014).  
An example of a water demand management plan is reducing the demand of water for 
agricultural and industrial uses by 25% and 10%, respectively, while maintaining the water 
demand for hydropower, environmental, and domestic uses at the original levels, as depicted in 
Figure 4.1. The main reason underneath this plan is that there is a great opportunity to reduce water 
demand from agricultural use, whereas other uses such as municipal use also have potential to 
reduce their water demand, but the potential may not be as large as that of agricultural use (Xiao 
et al., 2015a). It is reported that almost 70% of the extracted freshwater is used for irrigation 
purposes globally (FAO 2013), and the number can be as high as 80% in some regions such as 
California (Christian-Smith et al. 2012). Irrigation is generally considered as the largest water 
consumer in a basin. Moreover, irrigation often has the highest priority in regions having a prior 
rights system based on the doctrine of "first in time, first in rights". Meanwhile, irrigation water 
use efficiency is generally low, especially when a flood irrigation method is still widely utilized. 
The conserved water from agricultural uses can be reallocated to meeting urban demands or 
environmental purposes. A case study in California indicated that 13% of agricultural water 
consumption is able to be conserved for reallocation to other uses even if its irrigation water use 
efficiency is already above 73% (Christian-Smith et al. 2012). One can assume that more water 




















Figure 4.1 An example of a water demand management plan (based on Speed et al. 
(2013)) 
4.2.2 Modified Net Benefits Functions 
The reduction of water use is the consequence of water use efficiency improvement. Meanwhile, 
the net benefits function of each user may change along with water use efficiency improvement, 
and its net benefits from the utilization of water may change accordingly. In this section, the net 
benefits functions with water use efficiency improvement of each user will be investigated. 
A parameter ρ (k, t) is used to denote the level of water use efficiency improvement at demand 
site k during period t. The relation between water use efficiency improvement and level of water 
reduction is assumed to be linear for the sake of computation load. Then, it can be incorporated 
into the net benefits function of each user. For agricultural users, its modified net benefits function 
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An example of the comparison of agricultural user’s net benefits functions under different 
scenarios of efficiency improvement is depicted in Figure 4.2. It can be seen from the figure that 
under the assumption of quadratic form for the net benefit function, when the ordinate representing 
net benefits is fixed, less water is needed with major improvement in comparison to minor or no 
improvement to produce the same amount of net benefits; while when the abscissa reflecting water 
consumption is fixed, more net benefits are produced with major improvement.  
 
Figure 4.2 An illustrative example of quadratic net benefits functions under different 















Similarly, when the parameter ρ (k, t) is taken into consideration for MI users, the modified 
water price-demand function can be formulated as: 
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As an example, Figure 4.3 shows a plotting of the comparison of water price-demand 
functions under different scenarios of efficiency improvement. Accordingly, the modified net 
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Figure 4.3 An illustrative example of water price-demand functions under different 
levels of efficiency improvement for MI user 
 
4.2.3 Modified Cooperative Reallocation Game  
When a demand management plan is implemented, it may have different impacts on different 
users. For example, the user who reduces its water use may gain less benefits from the utilization 
of water, while the user who receives more water may produce greater benefits. As a matter of 
course, the aggregated benefits of the coalitions may also change accordingly. The economic 
impact on a water reduced user might also be positive because of the efficiency improvement. The 
aggregated benefits of coalitions with a water demand management plan may be represented as 
ṽ({1}), ṽ({2}), …, ṽ({n}), ṽ(S), and ṽ(N). Then, a new cooperative game (N, ṽ) is formed. 
All three conditions of individual and group rationality and joint efficiency must still be 
satisfied for solving the new cooperative game. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that no coalition 
will receive less benefits than the benefits gained from cooperative reallocation without a demand 












management plan. Therefore, the conditions of individual and group rationality should remain the 
same as equations (3.6) and (3.7), while the condition of joint efficiency is modified as: 




  (4.12) 
The core-based and non-core-based solution concepts are applied to the modified cooperative 
game, and new results can be obtained and be assessed. The structure of the Cooperative Water 
Allocation Model with a water demand management plan is shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 Structure of the Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) with a 
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4.3 Illustrative Case Study 
In this section, the illustrative case described in Section 3.3 is used to evaluate the impact of a 
water demand management plan on the economic benefits for water users. The network is shown 



















Figure 4.5 The network of the illustrative case study 
 
4.3.1 Specification of Water Demand Management Plans 
In this case, it is assumed that agricultural users’ demand will be reduced by different 
percentages, such as 0% (baseline), 5%, and 10%, while other users maintain their original water 
demand. Once all the users are satisfied, then no user is willing to participate in a coalition; 
therefore, there will be no need to reduce agricultural users’ demand further. It should also be 




4.3.2 Results and Discussions 
An uptrend can be observed for total net benefits from both initial water allocation and optimal 
reallocation as the level of reduction increases, as depicted in Figure 4.6. More specifically, when 
the PMMNF method is utilized for initial allocation, about 1,004 million dollars can be produced 
from initial allocation without any reduction, and it is increased to about 1,191 million dollars from 
optimal reallocation, which means an extra 187 million dollars can be produced through a grand 
cooperation. Along with the increased level of reduction, more net benefits can be generated, and 
it reaches up to about 1,284 million dollars when the level of reduction goes up to 30%. The 
increase demonstrates that not only is cooperation among water users more beneficial, but the 
demand management plan also is. Moreover, this increase gives incentives for water users to 
implement the demand management plan, as long as the additional net benefits are shared fairly 
among users so that everyone can receive more benefits. 
It is also observed that the gaps between the total net benefits from initial allocation and from 
optimal reallocation become smaller along with the increased level of reduction. The main reason 
for this is the conserved water from agricultural users is distributed to city users located 
downstream during the initial allocation. Since city users have a higher productivity than 
agricultural users do, as is normally the case, the overall benefits from initial allocation for the 
entire basin is growing rapidly, while the growth of total net benefits from optimal reallocation is 
more moderate. When the level of reduction reaches a certain percentage, all agricultural, 
domestic, general, and industrial users are fully satisfied; thus, there is no need for reallocation. 
This result demonstrates that water transfer from low productive users to high productive users 
can generate more beneficial outcomes. 
A similar uptrend can be observed for total net benefits from initial allocation and from 
optimal reallocation when the LMWSR method is utilized for initial allocation, as depicted in 
Figure 4.7. However, the increase is not as obvious as that from the PMMNF method. This is 
because the LMWSR method generates more evenly-spread water shortage ratios so that water is 






Figure 4.6 Total net benefits from initial water allocation and optimal reallocation for 
the grand coalition under different levels of reduction when initial water allocation is 
obtained from the PMMNF approach 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Total net benefits from initial water allocation and optimal reallocation for 
the grand coalition under different levels of reduction when initial water allocation is 
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The fact that cooperation is more beneficial is easy to understand. The key problems are how 
to fairly allocate the total net benefits among users, and how to evaluate the contribution of water 
users in implementing a demand management plan. For instance, the total net benefits without the 
plan are about 1,191 million dollars when the PMMNF method is utilized, as shown in Figure 4.6, 
and this is the total net benefits of the grand coalition. Similarly, the total net benefits of the grand 
coalition reach about 1,243 million dollars with a 20% reduction. Therefore, the question is how 
to share the 1,243 million dollars among stakeholders such that every stakeholder will get no less 
benefits than it can get without a 20% reduction. 
By applying the aforementioned modified cooperative game, the sharing of net benefits 
(participation value) for each stakeholder in the grand coalition can be estimated by various 
solution concepts. It should be noted that domestic, general, and industrial users who share the 
same source of water are grouped into one single stakeholder, such as City 1, to reduce the 
computational complexity. Figure 4.8 shows an example of the participation value with a 20% 
water reduction and the PMMNF is utilized for initial allocation. As can be seen from Figure 4.8, 
A2 and City 2 are allocated more net benefits than A1 and City 1 under the solution concepts of 
nucleolus, weak nucleolus, and Shapley value. This is because A2 is the main conserver of water, 





Figure 4.8 Participation value for stakeholders under various solution concepts for a 
20% reduction scenario in which the PMMNF method is utilized for initial water allocation 
 
It is important that no stakeholder will receive less net benefits with a plan than the net benefits 
it can get without a plan. A summary of the net benefits gained from the modified cooperative 
game for stakeholders with different levels of reduction under different cooperative solution 
concepts is depicted in Figure 4.9. The bar charts represent the total net benefits of irrigators (A1, 
A2), and line charts denote the total net benefits of city users (City 1, City 2). It can be seen that, 
compared to the baseline results, all stakeholders will receive more net benefits under the cases 
with water reduction. The more percentage of reduction, the more net benefits can be shared. It 
seems that under solution concepts such as nucleolus and weak nucleolus, more additional net 
benefits are shared by irrigators than by city users; while under proportional nucleolus and 
normalized nucleolus concepts, city users share more additional net benefits than irrigators. Under 
the concept of Shapley value, both irrigators and city users have a moderate growth in their net 
benefits. Overall, every stakeholder can expect an increase in net benefits when the demand 
management plan is carried out. The results also demonstrate the motivation for water users to 
















































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.9 Comparison between total net benefits gained from the modified 
cooperative game for stakeholders with different levels of reduction and baseline results 
under various solution concepts when initial allocation is obtained from the PMMNF 
approach 
When the net benefits functions with efficiency improvement are applied to the model, new 
allocation schemes and net benefits results can be obtained. The total net benefits will witness a 
further increase compared to the results with original net benefits functions, as shown in Figure 
4.10. In terms of the total net benefits for each stakeholder after cooperative reallocation, its pattern 
is quite similar to the results shown in Figure 4.6. This outcome indicates that more net benefits 






































































Figure 4.10 Total net benefits from allocation under different scenarios in which 
different levels of reduction and efficiency promotion are considered and initial allocation 
is obtained from the PMMNF method 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, a water demand management plan is specified and incorporated into the 
Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) to investigate its impact on water users. The results 
demonstrate several advantages of a water demand management plan. Firstly, more aggregated net 
benefits for the grand coalition can be yielded through water transfer from less productive users to 
more productive users and cooperation among water users. Secondly, every stakeholder is able to 
gain more net benefits by means of a modified cooperative game to fairly allocate the additional 
net benefits, which provides motivation for water users to carry out a demand management plan. 
Finally, water demand management can play an important role in alleviating water stress facing 
humanity in the near future, and prevent more water conflicts from happening. It can thus be of 
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Total net benefits from initial allocation
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Agent-based Modeling of Water Demand Management for Maximizing 
Benefits 
An agent-based modeling approach is proposed to simulate water users’ behavior for water 
demand management in a river basin. In this procedure, each agent controls his or her own strategy 
regarding whether or not to conserve water or consume more water in order to achieve a better 
economic return based on an initial allocation scheme. The effects of agents’ behaviors on their 
own economic returns and the aggregated impacts of individual behavior on the system are 
investigated. A positive incentive given to water conservers encourages agents to implement water 
demand management strategies, which in turn improve water use efficiency. A case study using 
this new agent-based approach reveals that agricultural users are the main contributors to water 
conservation. Compensation given to water conservers more than covers the benefit loss from less 
water consumption while other users gain benefits from the utilization of the conserved water. The 
results also indicate that the implementation of water demand management strategies is beneficial 
for the overall system from both economic and ecological perspectives. A comparison between the 
centralized approach in Chapter 4 and the decentralized method developed in this chapter is 
presented using the same case study.  
 
5.1 Motivation for Agent-based Model 
In Chapter 4, the incorporation of a specific water demand management plan into the 
cooperative water allocation model (CWAM) has demonstrated the advantages of the plan. 
However, there are several assumptions to the plan. Firstly, the capacities of agricultural users are 
assumed to be the same in the specified water demand management plan. In fact, each user may 
have different capacities to reduce its water demand because of the diversity of constraints. It is 
important to take the heterogeneity of capacities for water conservation into consideration in a 
water demand management problem. Secondly, a centralized process is utilized for the application 
of the specified water demand management plan, in which all users are assumed to comply with 
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the plan willingly. However, the willingness for water conservation may vary from user to user. 
In addition, water users’ willingness can be adaptive in a complex system. When water demand 
management studies on water consumption involves the perspective of users, it becomes more of 
a decentralized problem than a centralized one. Thirdly, perfect information exchange is assumed 
in the allocation process, which means that every user knows the water consumption and net 
benefits of itself as well as other users. In the real world, however, this assumption is very unlikely 
to be achieved. 
Agent-based modelling techniques can partially relax these assumptions since they possess 
the following characteristics: (1) they are an individual-driven modelling approaches, in which 
each agent has its own behavioral rules. Therefore, they can handle the problem of heterogeneity; 
(2) they are adaptive because each agent can change its behavioral rules according to the 
information it receives from other agents and the environment; and (3) perfect information 
exchange is not a necessary requirement. 
Water resources management is a relatively new field for ABM. However, because of the 
capability of ABM to investigate dynamic complex systems, a number of studies on the application 
of ABM can be observed. For example, Chu et al. (2009) utilized ABM techniques to evaluate the 
responses of different users in Beijing, China, in the face of a series of water supply and demand 
management policies such as financial rebate for replacing low-efficient appliances by high-
efficient ones. Kanta and Zechman (2013) investigated the effectiveness of water conservation-
based strategies using ABM methods in which users’ water demand level is influenced by policy 
makers’ selection of water conservation strategies and other users’ choices. Giacomoni et al. 
(2013) examined dynamic interactions among water use, land use, and urbanization progress 
within a complex adaptive system framework in which ABM is utilized to simulate the water use 
behavior of each household. Other interesting research topics using ABM technique include: water 
demand estimation (Athanasiadis et al., 2005), water sharing problems (Yang et al., 2009; Yang 
et al., 2012; Guiliani and Castelletti, 2013; Giuliani et al., 2014), and common pool resources 
management (Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Bristow et al., 2014). Berglund (2015) provides a 
comprehensive review of the employment of ABM in water resources management.  
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However, very few studies of ABM can be found in water demand management, and 
significant research advances could be accomplished in this subdomain. Because of varying 
capacities and willingness to conserve water by different users, ABM constitutes a well-suited 
technique for simulating water users’ actions regarding water conservation and their interactions 
within the context of water demand management. Accordingly, an agent-based model is proposed 
in this chapter to simulate changes in water users’ behavior, and to investigate individual and 
aggregated impacts on the system as a whole. This work possesses the following novelties: (1) The 
proposed model is a more general framework for water demand management in comparison to the 
existing research on estimating demand-price elasticities, which normally have a site-specific 
dependence. (2) water demand management is studied from a decentralized perspective, which 
considers the willingness and capability of different users in different ways. The involvement of 
individual decisions can greatly promote public participation and acceptance. (3) water demand 
management is considered in the context of basin-wide planning and management, thereby 
enabling the integration of demand side and supply side management. Therefore, water efficiency 
and productivity are emphasized. 
 
5.2 Agent-based Modeling for Water Demand Management  
A typical agent-based model possesses four main components (Macal and North, 2010; Bristow et 
al., 2014): (1) a set of agents in which each agent having attributes to distinguish it from other 
agents; (2) an environment within which agents can interact with it as well as other agents; (3) 
methods that agents use to update their attributes; and (4) an interaction mechanism that controls 
when and how to interact, and with whom. 
In an agent-based model for water demand management, each water user can be defined as 
an autonomous computational agent, structured as in Table 5.1. Each agent’s strategy is to decide 
whether to conserve water or consume more water, and how much water to conserve or consume, 




Table 5.1 Agent structure of the agent-based model 
Agent Type Attributes Decision Rules 
Proactive 
agent 
1. Level of water 
consumption; 
2. Level of net 
benefits represented 
by net benefits 
functions. 
1. After receiving a value of parameter given by 
the coordinator, each agent calculates the net 
benefits generated from water utilization and 
compensation or cost value; 
2. An agent chooses to conserve water only if the 
compensation value is greater than net benefits 
losses, or selects to consume more water if the 
net benefits produced from extra water 
utilization are more enough to cover the cost 
charged; 
3. An agent adjusts the level of water consumption 
to maximize his individual total economic 




1. Level of water 
consumption 




1. Overall net 
benefits; 
2. Total imbalance 
value. 
1. For each given value of parameter, monitor the 
decisions of individual agents and calculate the 
system-wide net benefits and total imbalance 
between the compensation and cost values; 
2. Update the value of parameter until the system-
wide net benefits cannot be improved and total 
imbalance cannot be decreased. 
 
If an agent decides to conserve water (hereinafter referred to as a water conserver), compensation 
will be provided to the agent; likewise, one has to pay a proper cost if he or she chooses to consume 
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more water (called a water consumer). An agent will conserve water only if the compensation 
value is greater than the net benefits loss from water conservation; otherwise, his initial rights will 
be maintained. Similarly, an agent will retain his initial rights unless the net benefits gained from 
extra water consumption cover the paid cost. In other words, no agent will receive fewer net 
benefits than the net benefits from the initial allocation. In some situations, one agent’s strategy 
could be affected by other agents’ decisions. For instance, water consumers cannot obtain extra 
water if there is no water conserver. Therefore, one should monitor behavioral changes regarding 
water consumption of agents and estimate the corresponding economic returns for agents within 
an agent-based framework. 
 
5.2.1 Individual Optimization Problem 
Within an agent-based framework for water demand management, each water user is defined as 
an agent having two main attributes: water consumption and net benefit function. An optimization 
problem is presented for each agent as the method to update his or her attributes. In the 
optimization problem, an agent updates his water consumption based on the initial water allocation 
to maximize the economic returns from water usage over the planning periods. In addition to 
updating water consumption using the optimization problem, an agent’s net benefit function will 
also be affected along with water use efficiency improvements resulting from the implementation 
of water demand management, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.   
All water users in a basin are categorized into two main types of agents: proactive and reactive 
agents. Proactive agents are those who can update their water consumption actively, such as 
agricultural, domestic, and industrial users; on the other hand, reactive agents represent those who 
can only reactively respond to the actions of proactive agents, but their interests will be reflected 
in the constraints. For instance, a specified level of instream flow is considered as the minimum 




5.2.1.1 Objective for Proactive Agents 
As mentioned earlier, each agent’s main objective in his or her own mind is to obtain economic 
returns over the planning periods as much as possible, either from extra water utilization or 
compensation. Let AGT be defined as a set of agents, and AGT = {1, 2, …, i, …, m}. For the ith 
agent, its individual optimization problem can be formulated as follows: 
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where Q reflects water consumption; NBit represents the net benefits produced from water 
utilization for agent i during period t, which is calculated by its net benefits function; INCit refers 
to the incentive values for agent i during period t; Cit means the cost of achieving water 
conservation for agent i during period t; and hi(Q) = 0 and gi(Q)  0 stand for the equality and non-
equality local constraints for agent i, respectively. The symbol Ω is used to signify the feasible 
region of the optimization problem subject to applicable constraints. 
The estimation of net benefit functions of agents should consider the different characteristics 
of agents, and can be represented using different forms, such as quadratic function form or derived 
from a water price-demand function. More details on net benefit functions for different agents are 
provided in Section 4.1.1 and 4.2.2.  
The incentive value for each agent can be calculated by using an incentive function shown as: 
( , )*[ ( , ) ( , )]it iniINC bc i t Q i t Q i t 
 (4.2) 
where bc(i, t) reflects the benefit or cost per unit of water conserved or consumed, respectively, 
for agent i during period t; and Qini(i, t) refers to the initial water allocation for agent i during period 
t. The value of the incentive function is positive when an agent consumes less water than its initial 
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allocation, and represents a compensation value to the agent. If the compensation value is greater 
than the net benefits loss and the cost, this agent is expected to obtain greater returns from water 
conservation. Therefore, it can be assumed that this agent will have incentives to implement water 
demand management strategies. 
 
5.2.1.2 Constraints 
Each agent seeks to maximize the economic benefits under certain hard constraints and/or soft 
restrictions. These constraints can be categorized into three main types: physical, policy, and 
system control constraints, as discussed in Section 3.2.1. However, not all constraints are applied 
to every agent. Only constraints related to a specific agent would be used to construct the solution 
space for that agent. For example, for an industrial agent, Equations (3.2) to (3.8) except Equation 
(3.5) are applicable. 
 
5.2.2 Coordination Procedure 
After specifying how each agent updates his or her behavior to achieve better economic returns 
individually, the next step is to design how they interact with one another or the environment. In 
this research, the agents interact in an indirect manner, whereby all agents respond to a parameter, 
which reflects the benefit or cost per unit water conserved or consumed, respectively, sent out by 
a coordinator (or policy maker) agent. A coordination procedure is required because without 
coordination some agents will attempt to obtain as much water as possible, which could result in 
a violation of the mass balance constraints in which the total allocated water to agents exceeds the 
available water supply. Although this violation can be interpreted as imported water from outside 
of the system or an indicator of water conservation objectives from a planning perspective, it 
should be avoided, or minimized as much as possible. 
Yang et al. (2012) demonstrated that using water price as a signal for a water sharing problem 
could lead to an equilibrium status in which all available water is allocated and all users are 
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satisfied with the allocation. In this work, a similar parameter reflecting the benefit or cost per unit 
water transferred is utilized as a signal to guide agents in making individual decisions. However, 
the objectives of this research are not only to redistribute water resources, but also to calculate the 
compensation needed for water conservers and the costs paid by water consumers. Then the 
imbalance of compensation and cost values is minimized to have a self-sustaining system. 
Moreover, in contrast to Yang et al.’s (2012) work, initial allocation schemes instead of water 
permits are used, because water permits only indicate how much water one should get, and not 
how much one actually obtains, especially under water shortage situations. The actual amount of 
water under one’s possession provides a more realistic meaning for water demand management. 
In addition, more complicated and realistic constraints for agents are considered in this research. 
More specifically, water loss during the transportation from one node to another is commonly 
observed in reality, and this loss is taken into account in Equation 3.2; return flow at a particular 
node from which water supply is provided to demand sites is excluded from the available supply 
at that node in Equation 3.8.  
The coordinator will monitor the behavior changes of each agent and the performance of the 
overall system arising from these individual alterations in behavior, and decide when to terminate 
the coordination. These behavior changes as expressed by changes in water consumption would 
have an effect on the net benefits produced from water utilization, and compensation or cost values 
for all of the agents. These changes can be further investigated in addition to the aggregated impact 
on the system. 
The coordination procedure controlled by the coordinator, shown as a flow chart in Figure 
5.1, starts by checking whether all the agents are fully satisfied during the initial allocation. If not, 
each agent makes individual decisions on whether or not to conserve water or consume more water 
and how much to conserve or consume under a given parameter bc(i, t). After individual decisions 
have been taken, the coordinator will assess the overall system performance by calculating the 
total imbalance of compensation and cost values, total net benefits, and the net benefits increment 
in comparison to the results in the previous iteration. The total net benefits are compared to that 
from the initial allocation in the first iteration. If the benefit increment is larger than a predefined 
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tolerance value (for instance, one thousandth of the total net benefits), then the system performance 
can still be improved, and another iteration is required with an updated parameter. Otherwise, the 
coordination process will be terminated, and the results of water allocation, net benefits, 
compensation or cost values for all of the agents, and the aggregated results for the system can be 
generated and interpreted. 
 
Figure 5.1 Coordination procedure 
5.3 Illustrative Case Study  
In this section, the behavior of different water users in a simplified basin network, reflecting an 
actual situation depicted in Figure 5.2, is simulated using the proposed agent-based model to 
investigate the impact of water demand management. 
Each agent makes 
decision 
individually  by 
solving his or her 
own optimization 
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The results of water 
allocation, net benefits, 
compensation or cost values 
for all of the agents, and the 
aggregated results for the 
system are obtained
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Figure 5.2 The network of the case study 
5.3.1 Scenarios of Study 
As aforementioned, an initial water allocation process is performed prior to the implementation of 
water demand management strategies to reflect social equity. The results of the initial allocation 
constitute a baseline case for this study in which no water demand management strategies are 
implemented. Therefore, the impact of different strategies can be observed, analyzed, and 
compared. It is assumed that different agents possess different water conservation limits due to 
technical and/or social-economic restrictions. For instance, an agent who decides to adopt drip 
irrigation will normally have greater potential than an agent who chooses to use flood irrigation. 
Therefore, a series of scenarios are designed based on conservation limits. More specifically, 
several percentages, such as 10%, 20%, and 30%, are specified as the maximum conservation an 
agent can achieve. 
5.3.2 Impact Analyses 
The impacts of the implementation of water demand management strategies can be analyzed from 
two perspectives: individual and aggregated viewpoints. The individual effects on each agent are 
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discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 while the aggregated impacts on the system are explained in Section 
4.3.2.2. 
5.3.2.1 Individual Agent’s Decisions and Economic Effects  
With the implementation of water demand management strategies in a water system, the individual 
decisions made by different agents over different values of the parameter bc can be firstly 
observed. Figure 5.3 depicts the detailed water rights changes by agents under the scenario of a 
20% conservation limit, while Figure 5.4 shows the net benefits changes by agents under the same 
scenario. It should be noted that the value of net benefits shown in Figure 5.4 are the sum of the 
net benefits gained from water utilization and compensation or cost. In fact, the patterns observed 
under other scenarios are similar to the results shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.  
Consider the case of agricultural use given as A1 in Figure 5.2. The water flow towards A1 
from R1 minus the water loss in the conduit is the effective inflow or water available for utilization 
by A1, and should be no more than A1’s demand during a particular time period. By subtracting 
the amount of water consumed by A1, the remainder is the return flow from A1 and is available to 
other downstream agents. Certainly, the water flow from R1 to A1 should not exceed the maximum 
capacity of the conduit, but should be more than a minimum requirement scheduled by policy 
makers or administration agents. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, two agents (A1 and A2) choose to conserve water until they 
reach their limit at bc = 0.1. However, their net benefits are expected to grow along with the 
increase in the value of the parameter bc, mainly because of the increase of compensation value, 
as indicated in Figure 5.4. This increase results in the growth of a total imbalance between 
compensation and cost values as shown by the dotted line in Figure 5.5. 
On the other hand, agents G2 and I1 are willing to consume extra water, as shown in Figure 
5.3, and can expect more economic returns from the additional water utilization even though they 
have to pay a cost. As indicated in Figure 5.4, the maximum economic return for both agents occur 
at bc = 0.1, and thereafter starts to decrease due to the increase of cost. However, from Figure 5.3, 
one can see that I1 reduces its water consumption starting at bc = 0.7. This implies the benefits 
 
 80 
gained from additional water utilization are not enough to cover the cost. From the bottom plot in 
Figure 5.3, one can observe that agent G1 also prefers to consume more water but only by a slight 
amount. Other agents select to retain their initial water rights, and procure no extra net benefits. 
Among these agents, D1 and D2 choose not to consume more water because they are already fully 
satisfied during the initial allocation; therefore, their net benefits changes are omitted in Figure 
5.4. It should be noted that since D1, I1, and G1 share the same supply node in the network, the 
return flow from one agent to the supply node is not available for other agents. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Water rights changes by agents over different values of the parameter bc 
































Figure 5.4 Net benefits changes by agents over different values of the parameter bc 
under the scenario of a 20% conservation limit 
5.3.2.2 System Performance 
The individual decisions made by agents may have different impacts on the system performance. 
One example is the increasing total imbalance resulting from the growing compensation to A1 and 
A2 even though they stop conserving water due to the conservation limit. The total imbalance of 
net benefits transferred is calculated by summing up all compensation values given to water 
conservers and all cost values paid by water consumers. A positive imbalance indicates that the 
compensation is larger than the cost, and can be interpreted as an infusion from outside of the 
system to make the strategies feasible. The infusion is expected to be as small as possible.   
As affected by the increasing total imbalance, the total net benefits determined by adding up 
the individual net benefits of all agents are continuously growing as well, as shown by the top 
curve in Figure 5.5. If the infusion is deducted from the total net benefits, the remainder represents 

































total net benefits produced by the system itself will reach its peak at bc = 0.1. This is also the point 
at which the coordination process stops, and the compensation to water conservers, cost paid by 
water consumers, net benefits for each agent, total infusion required, and total net benefit of the 
system itself are determined. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Total net benefits changes over different values of the parameter bc under 
the scenario of a 20% conservation limit 
 
5.3.3 Discussions and Insights  
The impact of water demand management on individual agents and the overall system under one 
scenario is explained in Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2. The optimal solution under different scenarios 
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Figure 5.6 shows the changes in water consumption for each agent whereby the bar on the left 
above each agent gives the initial allocation for that agent. The remaining bars above each agent 
indicate the amount of water a given agent is going to withdraw under different scenarios. As can 
be seen in Figure 5.6, both A1 and A2 prefer to conserve water until they reach their limits under 
all scenarios, since each of the bars to the right of the baseline scenario is lower than the baseline. 
Notice that when there is no conservation limit, both A1 and A2 relinquish all of their initial 
allocation, which is reflected by the absence of a bar in Figure 5.6. This also demonstrates the 
necessity of having conservation limits because food production is still essential for agricultural 
agents. All other agents, except D1 and D2, tend to consume more water compared to their 
baselines as long as there is extra water available. G2 and I1 are the two main water consumers 
who utilize most of the conserved water under all scenarios, and I2 is not able to obtain extra water 
under scenarios having limits because of this, but is another main water consumer under the 
scenario of no limit, as plotted on the far right in Figure 5.6. D1 and D2 are already fully satisfied 
during initial allocation and they would not like to conserve water as indicated by all of the bars 
having the same level as the baseline. The more water agricultural users conserve, the more water 
available to water consumers.  
In terms of an economic perspective, the net benefits for all agents, except D1 and D2, are 
projected to increase above the baseline, as depicted in Figure 5.7. Among these agents, A1 and 
A2 obtain more compensation to cover their benefit loss because of utilizing less water; conserving 
more water implies higher compensation. Although G2 and I1 are two main water consumers under 
all scenarios with limits, G2 produces greater benefits with additional water than I1 does. 
Furthermore, I2 is also able to generate massive benefits if there is extra available water as 
indicated by the bar on the far right in Figure 5.7. The fact that most agents are expected to gain 
more benefits and no one has less can encourage them to implement water demand management 
strategies.  
The implementation of water demand management is also beneficial for the overall system. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.8, the total net benefits produced by the system under all scenarios are 
better in comparison to the baseline case, and the higher is the conservation limit, the greater are 
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net benefits that can be produced. Even though the total imbalance is also higher under the scenario 
of a higher conservation limit, it is still a very small portion (less than 0.5% under all scenarios 
having limits) of the total net benefits produced. 
In addition to the economic impact of water demand management on consumptive uses, it is 
also important to investigate its effect on non-consumptive uses, since these uses are modeled as 
reactive agents and will only respond to the decisions of proactive agents. As shown by the top 
plot in Figure 5.9, total water rights to consumptive uses are decreasing in comparison to the 
baseline scenario. In contrast to consumptive uses, the water flow through the two instream flow 
requirement nodes, which are labelled as S1 and S2 in the network, are increasing; higher 
conservation limits mean more water available to non-consumptive uses. The increasing instream 
water flow could be extremely useful for maintaining environmental standards. The findings 
indicate that besides economic gains, benefits can also be garnered from an ecological perspective 
as depicted in Figure 5.9. 
 































Figure 5.7 Comparison of total net benefits changes by agents under different 
scenarios 
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Figure 5.9 Comparison of water rights to consumptive uses and non-consumptive uses 
 
5.4 Comparison between the Centralized and Decentralized Approaches 
The methods developed in Chapter 4 and this chapter are based on the same principle of increasing 
the aggregated benefits from the currently available water from two perspectives. More 
specifically, the centralized method presented in Chapter 4 is normally referred to as a command 
and control approach in which all users act cooperatively and a central planner makes decisions 
for all users. The decentralized method described in this chapter, on the other hand, promotes 
individual decision-making. Centralized approaches are normally considered to be more 
economically efficient than decentralized methods, but may be difficult to apply to large-scale real 
world problems (Yang et al., 2009; Tedesco et al., 2016). A comparison between the two types of 
methods is presented in this section using the same case study to investigate their performance 
differences. 
It should be noted that the water supply data used in this chapter are 25% of the supply data 
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supply and demand (Tables 3.1 and 3.2), and economic data (Appendix A) as used in this chapter, 
is utilized by each of the methods described in Chapters 4 and 5. The system-wide total net benefits 
and additional net benefits to users are determined for water demand management. Figure 5.10 
presents the results for the total net benefits obtained for the two methods when the initial 
allocation is calculated for the priority-based approach (PMMNF). It can be seen that the total net 
benefits for optimal reallocation with a certain level of reduction are greater than that for the agent-
based approach having the same level of conservation. This result is in accordance with the 
conclusion in the existing literature that centralized approaches perform better than decentralized 
ones from the aspect of economic efficiency. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Comparison of total net benefits from initial water allocation, optimal 
reallocation, and agent-based approach under different levels of conservation when initial 
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In terms of the additional net benefits shared to users under various solution concepts in the 
modified cooperative reallocation game (Chapter 4) and within the agent-based approach (Chapter 
5), Figure 5.11 shows the results of an example of 20% conservation. As can be seen in Figure 
5.10, for the cooperative reallocation game with a 20% reduction, the total net benefits are 996 
million dollars in comparison to the total net benefits in the baseline scenario for which 800 million 
dollars are obtained. Hence, there are 196 million dollars of additional net benefits which are 
shared across the four users in Figure 5.11. The calculation for the case of the agent-based approach 
is 145 million dollars of additional net benefits (obtained from Figure 5.10) which are shared by 
the four users in Figure 5.11. In addition, for the agent-based approach, the sharing of domestic, 
general, and industrial users within the same tributary are combined into one city user in order to 
compare this with the results of the cooperative reallocation game. The findings for the agent-
based approach are displayed at the far right in Figure 5.11 for each user.  
As can be seen from Figure 5.11, even though the total amount of additional net benefits in 
the agent-based approach is less than that in the cooperative reallocation game, the sharing of 
additional net benefits for certain users are greater than that for certain solution concepts in the 
cooperative reallocation game. For example, for user A1, the sharing in the agent-based approach 
is greater than that for the proportional and normalized nucleolus, but is less than that for the 
nucleolus, weak nucleolus, and Shapley value in the cooperative reallocation game. Under this 
situation, a certain user may prefer using certain solution concepts. For instance, user A1 would 
strongly prefer the results of the nucleolus because it can receive the most additional net benefits 
for this case, while user A2 prefers the weak nucleolus situation. Consequently, the selection of 
which solution sharing approach to adopt may require utilizing a bargaining and negotiation 
process. Various decision-making methods, such as the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 







Figure 5.11 Comparison of additional net benefits by users among various solution 




In this chapter, water users’ responses to water demand management strategies are simulated 
within an agent-based framework in order to investigate the effect of water demand management 
on individual users and the overall system. The results indicate that agricultural users are more 
likely to conserve water, while the benefits loss from water conservation can be compensated so 
as to achieve a better economic return. The conserved water can be distributed to other users to 
produce more economic benefits, but a portion of the extra benefits must be transferred in order to 
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provided to water conservers and other users could also benefit. The system performance is 
projected to be improved as well from both economic and ecological perspectives. Finally, the 




Conservation-Targeted Hydrologic-Economic Models for Water 
Demand Management 
A basin-wide hydrologic-economic optimization model is presented to estimate how much water 
consumption can be conserved while maintaining the same level of economic output. Water 
consumption is interpreted as either water diverted to consumptive users or water consumed by all 
users. Two different formulations for representing the two interpretations of water consumption 
are examined. The two formulations take into consideration the characteristics of different users, 
such as the consumption ratio and productivity. The model is applied to the South Saskatchewan 
River Basin (SSRB) in southern Alberta, Canada, where water scarcity is a severe issue. It is found 
that: a substantial amount of water can be conserved without sacrificing economic output; 
irrigation is the largest contributor while municipal and industrial users make a small difference in 
terms of water conservation; MI users make major economic contribution in order to retain the 
same level of system-wide aggregated benefits, and thereby overall water productivity can be 
considerably improved; and MI users’ reactions are diversified depending on the specified 
conservation targets: either water diverted to consumptive users or water consumed by all users. 
The implication of results can be used to facilitate a better understanding of present water usage 
and guide policy makers to make informed decision for water demand management. 
 
6.1 Conservation Targets 
Conservation normally means promoting the efficient use of water resources and reducing 
unnecessary water consumption such that more water can be preserved in reservoirs or aquifers 
for the purpose of environmental protection or other beneficial uses. Traditionally, water 
conservation is measured by the reduced amount of water diverted to a user. However, one may 
argue that most of the water diversions are returned to the water source, and only a small part is 
depleted. Conservation efforts among different users may not be evaluated fairly because of a 
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skewed distribution of the consumption ratio. In addition, water loss during the transportation 
process may constitute a considerable portion of water demand, and is ignored most times. 
Based on this argument, two different interpretations of water consumption are specified. One 
is the amount of water diverted to a user, and the other one is the volume of water consumed by a 
user. For basin-wide water demand management, consumptive users are the main focus. The 
conservation endeavours would be targeted at them under the traditional approach in which total 
amount of water diversion is calculated. However, if one only takes into account the portion of 
water not available for reuse, water loss during transportation should also be included.      
 
6.2 Hydrologic-Economic Optimization Model 
In this model, the main objective is to estimate the minimum requirement of total water 
consumption during all planning periods, subject to various physical and policy constraints. Based 
on the two different interpretations of water consumption specified for water demand management: 
water withdrawal by consumptive users or water consumed by all users, two different formulations 
are developed. The former with the minimum water withdrawal objective (refers to “minimum 
withdrawal formulation” hereafter) is expressed as: 
( , ) :  W
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where QW indicates total water withdrawal by consumptive users, and means the sum of all flows 
toward node k describing a consumptive user during period t; h(Q) = 0 and g(Q)  0 represent the 
equality and non-equality constraints respectively; and  is used to denote the feasible solution 
space of the problem. The latter with minimum water consumed objective (refers to “minimum 
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where QC implies total water consumed by all users, including water loss during transportation. 
eN(k, t) means the consumption coefficient (the ratio of water that is not returned to the water 
source) of node k during period t, and eL(k1, k, t) is the water loss coefficient during transportation 
due to evaporation or seepage in the link (k1, k) during period t. These coefficients are considered 
as given parameters in this paper. 
The constraints considered in this model include physical constraints, policy restrictions, and 
system control rules, as described in Section 3.2.1. 
In addition to the constraints mentioned in Section 3.2.1, there are also some other restrictions 
in this model. For example, one may want to relinquish all its water obtained from initial allocation, 
but this is not likely to happen in reality because some economic activities are required to maintain 
a certain level or because a high level of reduction is hard to achieve due to technological 
difficulties. A parameter  (k, t) is introduced to indicate this conservation limit. Therefore, water 
diverted to node k during period t should be no less than its initial allocation minus the amount of 
water one can conserve, and this restriction is shown as: 
      ,    ,  * 1 ,  iniQ k t Q k t k t  (5.3) 
where Qini(k, t) represents the initial water allocation to node k during period t. 
Furthermore, a reduction of water consumption should not jeopardize the performance of the 
system. As indicated in Equation 2.1, the benefits gained from water utilization and its associated 
water productivity are main indicators of system performance. The benefits are measured using 
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benefit functions in monetary terms here. To indicate that benefits would not become worse, a 
system control rule is specified as: 
   inikt kt
k t k t
NB NB   (5.4) 
where NBkt and NBktini represent the net benefits obtained from water utilization, and initial net 
benefits produced by using initial water allocation for node k during period t, respectively. 
 
6.3 Case Study 
The foregoing optimization model is applied to the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) in 
southern Alberta, Canada, as shown in Figure 6.1. The SSRB includes four major municipalities: 
Calgary, Lethbridge, Red Deer and Medicine Hat, and thirteen irrigation districts, which account 
for 13% and 75% of total water allocation, respectively, in the basin (Alberta Environment, 2003; 
2007). The SSRB adopts a priority-based water right system in which a water license is required 
for water diversion except for the predetermined statutory right for traditional agricultural users 
(6,250 cubic meters/year) and household users (1,250 cubic meters/year). The application of 
license follows the principle of “first in time, first in right”, and hence some recent (junior) users 




Figure 6.1 Location of the SSRB within Alberta, Canada 
6.3.1 Network and Input Data 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the SSRB is comprised of four river sub-basins: Red Deer, Bow, Oldman 
river basins and the portion of the South Saskatchewan River sub-basin located within Alberta. An 
abstracted node-link network of the SSRB is depicted in Figure 6.2, which includes 9 irrigation, 4 
domestic, 4 general, 4 industrial, 10 inflow, 1 outflow, 2 hydropower plants, 17 reservoirs, and 4 
instream flow requirement nodes. In this study, 13 irrigation districts are aggregated into 9 
irrigation regions according to the source of water diversion and agroclimatic conditions. The 
irrigation districts of Mountain View, Aetna, United, and Leavitt are considered as one demand 
node, as are the Raymond and Magrath districts. General demand refers to municipal excluding 
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domestic need, such as the demand of water for commercial, institutional and public infrastructural 
purposes. Irrigation, domestic, general and industrial users are categorized as consumptive users, 
and the remaining are non-consumptive users. Note that even though reservoirs and instream flow 
requirements are considered as non-consumptive users, there still is a specified demand for each 
of them in order to maintain a certain water depth for fisheries, recreation and ecosystem protection 
considerations. The name of those consumptive users and their representing nodes in the network 
are summarized in Table 6.1,. Their projected annual water demand in millions cubic meter (mcm) 
is listed in the rightmost column of the table, and total annual demand of all consumptive users is 
about 3.88 billion cubic meters. More detailed hydrological and economic data are provided in 
Appendix B. 
Table 6.1 Name and annual water demand of consumptive users in SSRB 
Node Name of Consumptive Users Annual Demand (mcm) 
A1 Western Irrigation Region 150.65 
A2 Bow River Irrigation Region 542.33 
A3 Eastern Irrigation Region 861.51 
A4 Lethbridge Northern Irrigation Region 381.64 
A5 Mountain View, Aetna, United, Leavitt Irrigation 
Regions 
55.58 
A6 Raymond and Magrath Irrigation Region 81.26 
A7 St. Mary River - West Irrigation Region 362.09 
A8 Taber Irrigation Region 224.87 
A9 St. Mary River - East Irrigation Region 575.83 
D1 City of Red Deer - Domestic  6.03 
D2 City of Calgary - Domestic 147.79 
D3 City of Lethbridge - Domestic 14.15 
D4 City of Medicine Hat - Domestic 7.04 
G1 City of Red Deer - General 5.69 
G2 City of Calgary - General 79.59 
G3 City of Lethbridge - General 16.77 
G4 City of Medicine Hat - General 8.35 
I1 City of Red Deer - Industrial 139.67 
I2 City of Calgary - Industrial 154.14 
I3 Eastern Industrial Region - Industrial 15.38 
I4 City of Medicine Hat - Industrial 50.99 




Figure 6.2 Network of the SSRB (based on Wang et al. (2008b)) 
Monthly water supply consists of inflow from outside of the basin and adjustment flow from 
small local tributaries for accounting in precipitations. Based on the work of Wang et al. (2008b) 
and data from the Water Survey of Canada’s HYDAT database (ECCC, 2017b), the long term 
averaged annual flow of the ten inflow nodes is about 4.4 billion cubic meters, and inflows during 
crop growing season (May to September) is higher than those during winter season. In this study, 
the monthly supply data of a dry year is selected, with an annual total inflow volume of 2.19 billion 
cubic meters and total adjustment flow of 2.31 billion cubic meters. It should also be noted that at 
least 50% of the annual natural flow must be passed to the downstream province Saskatchewan 
according to the 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment (Alberta Environment, 2003). 
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Consequently, the annual outflow at outflow node O1 shall be no less than 2.25 billion cubic 
meters, which makes the water available for users in the SSRB to be more restrained. In other 
word, a total demand of 3.88 billion cubic meters from consumptive user needs to be satisfied with 
2.25 billion cubic meters of water availability. 
Water is consumed during economic activities at consumptive sites with different 
percentages. For irrigation, it is reported that about 10% to 30% of water diverted to farms in the 
SSRB are returned to the water system (Alberta Environment, 2003; Adamowicz et al., 2010). In 
this study, the consumption coefficient for irrigation is set as 75%. For municipal users, 
consumption ratios are 15% and 25% for domestic and general users, respectively. An industrial 
user consumes about 5% of its water diversion. In addition, water evaporated during transportation 
is set to be 3%, and could potentially be up to 7% (AIPA, 2010).  
 
6.3.2 Results and Discussions 
The results obtained from minimum withdrawal and minimum consumed formulations under a 
series of conservation limit scenarios are discussed and compared in this section. It is worthwhile 
to mention that even though the scenario of no conservation limit is also examined, but it is unlikely 
for one user to reduce water usage by too much in the short term. Therefore, it is more meaningful 
to focus on the results under low conservation limit scenarios. In fact, the consumption level 
change of different users can be clearly observed within a 50% conservation limit. The baseline 
scenario is obtained from a priority-based initial allocation method proposed by Wang et al. 
(2007a). In the baseline scenario, the irrigation districts of Western (A1), Eastern (A3), Mountain 
View, Aetna, United, and Leavitt (A5), and Raymond and Magrath (A6) are able to divert water 
to their maximum demand, and all MI users except general and industrial demand in the city of 
Calgary (G2 and I2) are fully satisfied. Return flow is considered under both formulations. The 
total amount of water diverted to all consumptive users is 3,467.6 mcm, and irrigation accounts 
for 2,927.3 mcm, which is 84.4% of the total diversion. 
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6.3.2.1 Results under the Minimum Water Withdrawal Formulation 
Under the minimum withdrawal formulation in Equation 5.1, the system performance considering 
different conservation limits are summarized in Table 6.2. For the scenario of having a 50% 
conservation limit in Table 6.2, the total water withdrawal by all consumptive users can be reduced 
to 1967.5 mcm from 3467.6 mcm in the baseline scenario, which is a 43.3% conservation. The 
irrigation’s water withdrawal accounts for 1463.7 mcm, which is 74.4% of the total water 
withdrawal. However, irrigation contributes 97.6% of the total water conservation. The remaining 
2.4% conservation comes from the MI users, whose withdrawal reduces to 503.8 mcm from 540.3 
mcm in the baseline scenario. The aggregated economic benefits of consumptive users under all 
scenarios are equal to the value in the baseline scenario. These findings imply that the same level 
of economic benefits can be produced by utilizing much less water, with conservation from both 
the irrigation and MI sectors. Irrigation contributes a majority of the total water usage reduction, 
whereas the MI usage seems hard to be significantly reduced. In an extreme scenario of having no 
conservation limit, the MI users even take more water than their initial allocation, thereby making 
irrigation’s contribution more than 100%. An important indicator for system performance is the 
overall water productivity. As can be seen from the last row in Table 6.2, the overall productivity 
increases from 0.44 $/m3 to 0.77 $/m3, a 75% improvement, between the scenarios of baseline and 
50% limit, and can increase more under higher conservation limit scenarios. 
In terms of the water consumption level of each individual user, Figure 6.3 depicts the change 
patterns of irrigation users. As major conservation contributors, irrigation’s water consumption 
level change with respect to water conservation limit is obvious, as indicated in Figure 6.3. 
Specifically, all irrigation users are reducing their water usage, including the unsatisfied ones in 
the baseline scenario, until they reach their conservation limits under all scenarios. After the limit 
of 80%, the consumption level for each irrigation user remains the same because there is a 
minimum demand requirement equivalent to 20% of one’s maximum demand. However, the water 
productivity of each irrigation user shows an upward trend, as depicted in Figure 6.4. For example, 
A3’s productivity increases from 0.05 $/m3 in the baseline to 0.07 $/m3 under the 50% limit 
scenario, and to 0.10 $/m3 under no limit scenario.   
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Table 6.2 System performance under the scenarios of different conservation limits and 
minimum withdrawal formulation 
Scenarios: Baseline 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% No limit 
Total Water 
Withdrawal (mcm) 
3467.6 3151.9 2842.4 2543.9 2251.8 1967.5 1688.3 1411.9 1192.7 1192.7 1192.7 
Irrigation Water 
Withdrawal (mcm) 
2927.3 2634.6 2341.9 2049.1 1756.4 1463.7 1170.9 879.1 647.1 647.1 647.1 
MI Water 
Withdrawal (mcm) 




84.4% 83.6% 82.4% 80.6% 78.0% 74.4% 69.4% 62.3% 54.3% 54.3% 54.3% 
Total Water 
Conservation (%) 












0.44 0.48 0.53 0.59 0.67 0.77 0.90 1.07 1.27 1.27 1.27 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Water consumption level of irrigation users under the scenarios of different 





































Figure 6.4 Productivity of irrigation users under the scenarios of different 
conservation limits and minimum withdrawal formulation 
 
In contrast, the responses of MI users are quite diversified. As can be seen in Figure 6.5, more 
water is utilized by G2 and I2 along with the increase of the conservation limit, whereas other MI 
users reduce their water usage to a certain level and then start to increase their usage. It is believed 
that marginal net benefit is the key factor influencing all MI users’ responses, as clearly indicated 
in Figure 6.6 that all MI users’ marginal net benefits are merging to the same value.  
As portrayed in Figure 6.6, in the baseline scenario, G2 and I2 possess higher marginal values 
than the other MI users. The values are 2.09 $/m3 for G2 and 1.92 $/m3 for I2, whereas the values 
of the other MI users range from 0.36 $/m3 to 0.83 $/m3. Consequently, all other MI users are 
reducing their water usage and their marginal values are increasing. G2 and I2’s marginal values 
merge the earliest under the 10% limit scenario with a merged value of 1.92 $/m3. For the other 
MI users, if one user’s marginal value is still less than the merged value, the user will continue to 
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seen that all MI users’ marginal values become identical under the 50% limit scenario and 
afterwards. This implies that after the 50% limit scenario all MI users are equally efficient in terms 
of benefit generation. In other words, they are able to produce the same amount of net benefit with 
every additional unit of water, and they would increase their water usage in a proportional manner 
if more net benefits need to be produced. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Water consumption level of MI users under the scenarios of different 




































Figure 6.6 Marginal net benefit of MI users under the scenarios of different 
conservation limits and minimum withdrawal formulation 
 
6.3.2.2 Results under the Minimum Water Consumed Formulation 
When minimum water consumed by all users is set as the objective function following Equation 
(5.3), the resulting system performance under different conservation limit scenarios are 
summarized as in Table 6.3. Again, consider a 50% limit scenario as an example, for which the 
total water consumed by all users can be reduced from 2254.3 mcm in the baseline scenario to 
1153.0 mcm, which is a 48.9% water conservation. Water consumed by irrigation accounts for 
1097.7 mcm, and 55.3 mcm is consumed by MI users. The share of irrigation in the total water 
consumed is 95.2%, but irrigation contributes 99.7% of the total water conservation. These two 
high percentages imply that irrigation is not only the dominant water consumer but also the major 
water contributor in the basin, whereas the MI users make a very minor difference in terms of 
water conservation. This finding is in accordance with the implication in the previous formulation, 
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produced under all scenarios, it can be calculated that the overall productivity increases from 0.67 
$/m3 to 1.31 $/m3 between the scenarios consisting of baseline and 50% limit, as shown in the last 
row in Table 6.3, which makes a 95.5% improvement. 
 
Table 6.3 System performance under the scenarios of different conservation limits and 
minimum consumed formulation 
Scenarios: Baseline 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% No limit 
Total Water 
Consumed (mcm) 
2254.3 2030.5 1808.3 1589.1 1371.1 1153.0 934.7 717.4 544.7 544.7 544.7 
Irrigation Water 
Consumed (mcm) 
2195.5 1975.9 1756.4 1536.8 1317.3 1097.7 878.2 659.3 485.4 485.4 485.4 
MI Water 
Consumed (mcm) 
58.8 54.6 51.9 52.3 53.8 55.3 56.5 58.1 59.3 59.3 59.3 
Irrigation Consumed 
Percentage (%) 
97.4% 97.3% 97.1% 96.7% 96.1% 95.2% 94.0% 91.9% 89.1% 89.1% 89.1% 
Total Water 
Conservation (%) 












0.67 0.74 0.84 0.95 1.10 1.31 1.62 2.11 2.78 2.78 2.78 
 
At the individual level, the water consumption levels of the irrigation users are identical as 
drawn in Figure 6.3. The irrigation users’ water productivities also show a similar upward trend in 
this case as in the previous formulation. This indicates that the only effective constraint for 
irrigation users is the conservation limit constraint. However, there are substantial difference with 
respect to the reactions of MI users, as depicted in Figure 6.7. More specifically, I2 is the only one 
who consumes more water under all scenarios, and reaches its maximum demand under the 60% 
limit scenario. In contrast, G2, which shares the same pattern as I2 in the previous formulation, 
reacts differently. G2 only starts to increase its water usage when the limit is larger than 20%. The 
industrial users I1, I2 and I4 start to increase their consumption levels at the scenarios of 50%, 
20% and 40% limits, respectively. All of the other MI users are generally reducing their water 
usage to a certain level and then turn to growing their water usage. 
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Meanwhile, the differences among MI users can also be observed in their various marginal 
net benefit as shown in Figure 6.8. Unlike the result that same marginal value shared for all MI 
users after the 50% limit scenario in the previous formulation, marginal values in this case tend to 
merge based on the types of users. The general users possess the highest average marginal value, 
domestic the second highest, and industrial the lowest in this formulation. This is because more 
water is distributed to industrial users, as industrial users have the lowest consumption ratio and 
general users the highest. The fact that the industrial users have a favorable position is very sensible 
in the formulation which is targeted on minimizing water consumed by all users, because industrial 
users consume the least of its water diversion among all users.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 Water consumption level by MI users under the scenarios of different 



































Figure 6.8 Marginal net benefits of MI users under the scenarios of different 
conservation limits and minimum consumed formulation 
 
6.3.2.3 Comparisons and Insights  
The results of the two formulations provide some similar findings and also some different 
outcomes. Similar findings include: a substantial amount of water can be conserved while 
producing the same level of economic benefits; irrigation is the largest water contributor while MI 
users make a small difference in water conservation; MI users make economic contributions in 
order to maintain the same level of aggregated benefits, and thereby overall water productivity can 
be considerably improved.  
The water consumption levels of the MI users are different between the two formulations. 
These differences are calculated by using the results of the minimum consumed formulation minus 
that of minimum withdrawal formulation, and are summarized in Table 6.4. These findings 
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by I1. Other MI users, especially G2, tend to consume less water under the minimum consumed 
formulation. 
 
Table 6.4 A comparison of water withdrawal by municipal and industrial users 
between two formulations (mcm) 
Scenarios: Baseline 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% No limit 
D1 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.17 -0.41 -0.44 -0.42 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
D2 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.91 -3.60 -7.44 -6.99 -6.35 -5.78 -5.78 -5.78 
D3 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.64 -0.72 -0.66 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 
D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.22 -0.53 -0.57 -0.55 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 
G1 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.55 -0.77 -0.80 -0.78 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 
G2 0.00 -6.75 -9.85 -8.64 -8.73 -10.86 -10.73 -10.51 -10.29 -10.29 -10.29 
G3 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.38 -1.25 -1.97 -2.06 -2.02 -1.97 -1.97 -1.97 
G4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.57 -1.17 -1.22 -1.21 -1.20 -1.20 -1.20 
I1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.72 12.89 14.28 15.47 15.47 15.47 
I2 0.00 8.33 13.83 17.08 18.19 14.39 14.67 10.97 7.95 7.95 7.95 
I3 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.92 0.91 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.31 
I4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.90 4.20 3.93 4.33 4.68 4.68 4.68 
 
It is interesting to note that a large portion of the conserved water from irrigation is not utilized 
by MI users, because MI users are also reducing their usage in most scenarios. This portion of 
water is stored in reservoirs or instream flows, and can be used to meet the requirement of 
ecosystem protection, fisheries or recreation. In addition, if more benefits are required from the 
system, the stored water can be released to consumptive users as well. It is estimated that total net 
benefits can be improved by 11% when all MI users consume water to their maximum demand. 
Nevertheless, this finding may raise another question: is it necessary to involve irrigation 
users if their conservation is not utilized by MI users? To address this question, another case, in 
which only MI users are involved, is built and tested by using the two formulations. Water 
conservation percentages under both formulations are as listed in Table 6.5. As can be seen in the 
table, if only the MI users are involved, at most 2.4% of the water withdrawal can be conserved 
under the minimum withdrawal formulation, and 0.4% of water consumed under the minimum 
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consumed formulation. As a result, it is necessary to include irrigation users because both 
percentages are much less than those in the cases that all users are involved. This conclusion can 
also be supported by the finding in the previous sections that MI users only make a small 
contribution to water conservation. 
 
Table 6.5 A comparison of water conservation percentages among different 
formulations 
Scenarios: 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% No limit 
Min Withdrawal 
Formulation 
All Users 9.1% 18.0% 26.6% 35.1% 43.3% 51.3% 59.3% 65.6% 65.6% 65.6% 
MI Only 0.8% 1.4% 1.8% 2.1% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
Min Consumed 
Formulation 
All Users 9.9% 19.8% 29.5% 39.2% 48.9% 58.5% 68.2% 75.8% 75.8% 75.8% 
MI Only 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
 
A publication on investigating water available for future growth and economic development 
in southern Alberta was recently published. Specifically, by using a statistical method, Bennett et 
al. (2017) explored the amount of unused water from irrigation districts, major urban and rural 
communities, and transferred water. They found that on average 54.5% of the licensed allocation 
of irrigation districts, and 56.1% of the licensed allocation of major urban and rural communities 
have not been utilized during the last decade. The total volume of transferred water has been 35.3 
mcm since 2003, which is relatively low in comparison to an annual mean diversion of 1,611 mcm 
for irrigation and an annual mean use of 304 mcm for urban areas. Hence, it was concluded that 
there is sufficient water for meeting future increasing demand.   
However, there are two major distinctions between this study and that of Bennett et al. (2017). 
Firstly, their study was carried out based on licensed allocation and this investigation is founded 
based on initial allocation. It is argued that the initial allocation under a given water availability 
constitutes a more sensible baseline scenario for water demand management because initial 
allocation indicates the actual amount of water under one’s control while licensed allocation only 
implies the maximum amount of water one can withdraw. In water shortage cases, a user with high 
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licensed allocation may not be able to obtain any water since there are other senior users possessing 
higher priority for water diversion. Therefore, an initial allocation step is necessary before the 
implementation of water demand management. Secondly, hydrological considerations are not 
entertained in their study, which may lead to an overestimation or underestimation of water 
availability for future needs. For instance, water in one tributary (sub-basin) is physically 
unavailable for users in another tributary (sub-basin) if there is no connecting conduit, and failing 
to consider this may result in an overestimation. In addition, return flows from upstream users can 
be a source of water for downstream users, and an underestimation may occur if return flow is not 
taken into account. 
 
6.4 Summary  
Two versions of a basin-wide hydro-economic optimization model are developed to estimate the 
minimum water requirement to produce no less net benefits under different conservation limit 
scenarios. The minimum requirement with a given conservation limit can be considered as an 
achievable conservation target for water demand management. It is found that for the SSRB case 
irrigation is the largest water consumer and can be the greatest contributor in water conservation, 
and should be the first place to investigate. MI users’ main contribution is on the economic side 
rather than water side, even though their reactions regarding conservation limit are diversified 
depending on the formulation used. It is important to involve both the irrigation and MI users for 
the basin-wide water demand management, because without irrigation users, MI users have limited 
effectiveness in reducing overall water withdrawal or water consumed without sacrificing overall 
net benefits. Therefore, it can be argued that any attempt of water demand management strategies 
in a basin without considering irrigation user could hardly be successful to alleviate water stress 
faced by water managers and users. By the implementation of basin-wide water demand 
management, the overall water productivity is considerably improved on account of the significant 
water conservation from the irrigation sector and the economic benefits produced from MI sectors.  
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Overall, this study presents a hydrologic-economic perspective to estimate conservation 
potential in a basin, and can be utilized to assist in designing better strategies for water demand 
management. Even though great conservation potential is observed in the SSRB case, relatively 
low level of successful water transfer demonstrates that converting the potential to real exercises 
is not easy. There are still many obstacles that need to overcome for promoting water transfer 
among users in a basin, especially within a prior water right system. Most importantly, proper 




Contributions and Future Opportunities 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
The overall contribution of this dissertation is the development of various water demand 
management methodologies based on two principles: one is to increase the aggregated benefits 
given the current water availability; another is to decrease the aggregated water consumption while 
maintaining at least the same level of benefits. The specific original contributions in this thesis are 
summarized in Table 7.1 and explained in more detail below.  
 
Table 7.1 Summary of main contributions to the development of water demand 
management methodologies 
Chapter Main Contributions 
2 & 3 
A comprehensive review of various aspects of water demand 
management provides a better understanding of the advantages and 
barriers for water demand management. Equitable initial allocation 
methods are introduced to obtain a baseline scenario for various 
water demand management methodologies.  
4 
A modified cooperative game is presented for fairly sharing 
additional net benefits under the cases when water demand 
management plans are implemented.   
5 
An agent-based model is proposed for investigating the responses of 
different users regarding water conservation and compensation.  
6 
A hydrologic-economic model is presented for estimating the 
minimum water requirements without compromising benefits based 




An in-depth analysis of several aspects of water demand management is provided in Chapter 
2. The analysis of key characteristics of consumptive uses furnishes a better understanding of how 
they can be managed, which is fundamental to water demand management. The comprehensive 
review of water demand management definitions and measures emphasizes the well-established 
technological capacity and the importance of positive incentives in the implementation of water 
demand management. Water demand management at the basin level has rarely been studied, but 
when it is integrated as a component into a basin water allocation framework, it can provide more 
options for water management. Two equitable initial water allocation models are introduced in 
Chapter 3 to obtain the initial water rights under one’s control with a given water availability. This 
initial allocation constitutes a baseline scenario for various water demand management 
methodologies.       
Based on the characteristics of different consumptive uses, a water demand management plan 
is specified and incorporated into a fair water allocation model in Chapter 4 in which its associated 
impacts on individual users and the overall system are assessed. A modified cooperative 
reallocation game is put forward to fairly redistribute the additional benefits among users under 
various scenarios having a water demand management plan. A range of core-based and non-core-
based solution concepts within cooperative game theory are incorporated into the modified 
cooperative reallocation game. The results of an illustrative case study demonstrate that under all 
solution concepts, the net benefits of the overall system and individual users are improved in 
comparison to the scenario without a water demand management plan. These additional net 
benefits may provide positive incentives for individual users to implement water demand 
management and improve the benefits further more. 
An agent-based model is proposed for water demand management in Chapter 5 to take into 
account the heterogeneity of capacities and willingness levels of different users. The decision rule 
of each agent is converted to an individual optimization problem in which each agent aims to 
maximize his or her own net benefits, either from water utilization or compensation, without 
violating hydrologic and socio-economic constraints related to this agent. The interaction 
mechanism among agents and the environment is expressed by a coordination procedure. The 
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decisions made by individual agents and the impacts of these individual decisions on the overall 
system are monitored by a coordinator. The system performance serves as a termination criterion 
for the coordination procedure, and the coordination stops when the aggregated net benefits of the 
overall system reaches its maximum. The results of an illustrative case study demonstrate that 
water is transferred from agricultural agents to municipal and industrial agents, and compensation 
is given to agricultural agents. All agents can be motivated to implement water demand 
management because of the accruement of more net benefits.  
According to the second principle: “to decrease aggregated water consumption while 
achieving at least the same level of benefit”, two formulations representing two different 
interpretations of water consumption are proposed in Chapter 6 to estimate the minimum water 
requirement. The case study in the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) demonstrates that 
great conservation potential is observed, but requires the cooperation of the irrigation, and 
municipal and industrial users. 
 In summary, a useful array of possible solutions consisting of several methodologies on 
demand management is put forward for alleviating water stress facing society from a systems 
management perspective. The results of several illustrative case studies demonstrate the usefulness 
and advantages of incorporating water demand management into a basin water allocation 
framework. Meaningful insights and implications on how to encourage water users to utilize water 
wisely are obtained and can be used to support more informative water management. 
 
7.2 Future Opportunities 
As summarized in the previous section, this research in thesis includes several original 
methodologies for water demand management purposes, which can be further expanded. In 
addition, water demand management involves more aspects than what have been presented in this 
dissertation, and, hence, more work can be executed in the future. Worthwhile future research 
opportunities are now explained. 
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In Chapter 4, only water reduction by irrigators is investigated. However, domestic, general, 
and industrial users also have a huge potential for using less water, as indicated by a case study in 
California that found that about 30% of its urban water use can be conserved (Gleick et al. 2003). 
Consequently, the positive impacts of incorporating the water conservation of urban users into a 
water demand management plan can be further investigated. 
In Chapter 5, the value of benefit or cost per unit of water conserved or consumed is assumed 
to be the same for all agents. However, the presence of diverse values for different agents may 
reflect real situations more realistically. Therefore, these cases can be further examined using 
empirical data.  
In Chapter 6, the value of conservation limit parameter is assumed to be the same for all users. 
However, in the short term, some municipal or industrial users may not be able to conserve a 
significant amount of water. In this case, different conservation limits of different users can be 
taken into consideration and tested through scenario analyses. 
The second principle of decreasing aggregated water consumption while achieving no less 
benefits than the current ones can also be investigated from a decentralized perspective. Therefore, 
one can explore how to best coordinate users such that both the individual and system benefits are 
at least the same as current levels whereas aggregated water consumption is minimal.  
Valuable insights are obtained by using illustrative case studies; however, more complex real 
world case studies can be further tested. Additionally, water demand management can also be 
studied from other perspectives, such as institutional and legal viewpoints. 
The approaches developed in this dissertation are deterministic. However, uncertainty often 
exists in both hydrologic and economic aspects of water demand management problems, and may 
play an important role in affecting users’ decisions. Hence, uncertainty could be incorporated into 
the approaches developed in this thesis in the future.   
In this research, water transfers from agricultural users to city users are considered as a way 
to improve basin-wide productivity. However, the decrease of water consumption in agriculture 
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may have an impact on food production. The specific impacts could be investigated within the 
food-water-energy nexus. 
Three overarching goals are emphasized in this two-stage planning procedure, in which social 
equity is addressed in the initial allocation step, economic efficiency is improved through transfers 
among users in the second step, and environmental sustainability is taken into account in both 
steps. Assessing how well all three goals are considered within an overall framework is an 
interesting problem to investigate. A systematic evaluation of the improvements of the three goals 
by using a series of indexes, such as conservation target achieved, net benefits reached, joint 
efficiency obtained, and productivity met, could be a worthwhile direction for future research 
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Appendix A 
Economic Input Data for Case Study in Chapters 4 and 5  
This appendix A provides the economic input data used in the case study in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
 
Table A.1 Choke quantity (Q0) of the monthly water demand function for MI nodes (mcm*) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 0.233 0.217 0.233 0.236 0.235 0.257 0.259 0.270 0.246 0.258 0.239 0.248 
D2 6.582 5.825 6.412 6.497 6.469 6.469 7.723 7.501 6.840 6.753 6.412 6.497 
G1 0.249 0.232 0.249 0.253 0.260 0.284 0.287 0.299 0.272 0.276 0.256 0.266 
G2 3.955 3.500 3.853 3.904 3.995 3.995 4.770 4.632 4.225 4.058 3.853 3.904 
I1 2.608 2.608 2.771 2.934 4.629 4.792 4.890 4.890 4.238 4.075 2.608 2.608 
I2 6.273 6.273 6.665 7.057 11.135 11.527 11.762 11.762 10.194 9.802 6.273 6.273 
*1 mcm = 1 million cubic meters 
 
 
Table A.2 Choke price (P0) of the monthly water demand function for MI nodes ($/m3) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
D2 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
G1 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
G2 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
I1 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 
I2 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 
 
 
Table A.3 Scale parameter α (k, t) of the monthly water demand function for MI nodes 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 0.443 0.413 0.443 0.449 0.526 0.574 0.580 0.604 0.550 0.491 0.455 0.473 
D2 12.531 11.088 12.207 12.369 14.466 14.466 17.270 16.772 15.296 12.855 12.207 12.369 
G1 0.412 0.384 0.412 0.417 0.487 0.531 0.536 0.559 0.509 0.456 0.423 0.439 
G2 6.529 5.777 6.360 6.444 7.475 7.475 8.924 8.666 7.903 6.698 6.360 6.444 
I1 7.846 7.846 8.336 8.827 13.927 14.417 14.711 14.711 12.750 12.259 7.846 7.846 







Table A.4 Price elasticity β (k, t) of the monthly water demand function for MI nodes 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
D2 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
G1 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
G2 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
I1 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 
I2 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 
 
 
Table A.5 Water cost for water withdrawal and diversion to municipal and industrial demand 
nodes ($/m3) 
 
 Water treatment Water distribution Wastewater treatment Total cost 
D1 0.1404 0.1092 0.2028 0.4524 
D2 0.0673 0.0659 0.1426 0.2758 
G1 0.1404 0.1092 0.2028 0.4524 
G2 0.0673 0.0659 0.1426 0.2758 
I1 0.1404 0.1092 0.2028 0.4524 
I2 0.0673 0.0659 0.1426 0.2758 
 
 
Table A.6 Water cost for water withdrawal to agricultural demand nodes ($/m3) 
 
 Pumping cost 







Hydrologic and Economic Input Data for Case Study in Chapter 6  
This appendix B provides the input data used in the SSRB case study in Chapter 6.  
Table B.1 Monthly water supply from surface runoff at inflow nodes (mcm*) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
IN1 6.910 6.181 6.683 9.240 40.042 78.019 68.031 47.676 29.160 18.749 10.303 7.995 
IN2 12.053 9.870 10.298 13.608 68.701 163.296 143.294 89.592 50.803 31.471 18.662 14.062 
IN3 13.794 11.467 10.231 5.754 6.227 10.498 10.874 9.415 7.089 6.803 10.485 13.526 
IN4 3.817 3.411 4.312 6.104 19.418 31.493 20.892 12.455 10.212 8.531 5.962 4.634 
IN5 0.469 0.943 3.134 3.447 2.772 2.864 2.397 1.594 1.503 1.339 0.850 0.581 
IN6 3.254 2.830 4.111 11.223 52.229 64.282 27.454 11.798 8.178 7.178 5.314 3.924 
IN7 0.147 0.151 0.364 1.309 4.486 4.147 1.714 0.943 0.674 0.570 0.334 0.214 
IN8 5.343 4.342 5.156 14.386 66.290 97.848 44.595 15.133 10.666 11.490 9.746 6.455 
IN9 2.518 2.286 2.812 7.944 29.328 39.398 21.829 9.455 6.247 6.522 4.977 3.227 
IN10 5.879 5.189 7.151 17.366 63.880 94.738 49.818 22.766 18.014 17.142 12.519 7.700 
*1 mcm = 1 million cubic meters 
 
 
Table B.2 Monthly water supply of flow adjustments from local tributaries for accounting for 
precipitations (mcm). Water adjustments only occur at junction, reservoir, instream flow, and 
outflow nodes. 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
J1 4.375 3.319 6.563 9.014 22.743 30.097 25.609 22.177 17.236 5.242 4.639 4.601 
J2 0.669 0.508 1.004 1.379 3.480 4.605 3.918 3.393 2.637 0.802 0.710 0.704 
J3 0.669 0.508 1.004 1.379 3.480 4.605 3.918 3.393 2.637 0.802 0.710 0.704 
J4 3.130 2.374 4.695 6.449 16.270 21.532 18.321 15.865 12.331 3.751 3.319 3.292 
J5 5.852 4.439 8.778 12.057 30.420 40.258 34.254 29.664 23.055 7.012 6.205 6.155 
J6 1.030 0.679 1.405 1.833 3.132 3.689 2.781 2.681 2.318 1.107 0.989 0.978 
J7 2.148 3.060 2.446 4.848 5.309 10.042 2.000 6.299 4.942 1.651 2.099 1.418 
J8 0.710 0.468 0.968 1.263 2.159 2.542 1.917 1.848 1.598 0.763 0.682 0.674 
J9 4.393 2.895 5.990 7.812 13.354 15.725 11.856 11.432 9.884 4.717 4.218 4.168 
J10 1.869 1.343 0.748 0.328 0.090 0.443 0.009 0.499 0.802 0.052 0.135 0.069 
R1 2.164 1.230 1.925 2.574 6.378 10.490 10.603 7.984 5.638 2.255 1.811 1.948 
R2 0.644 0.489 0.966 1.327 3.348 4.431 3.770 3.265 2.538 0.772 0.683 0.677 
R3 0.644 0.489 0.966 1.327 3.348 4.431 3.770 3.265 2.538 0.772 0.683 0.677 
R4 0.033 0.025 0.050 0.069 0.174 0.230 0.195 0.169 0.132 0.040 0.035 0.035 
 
 138 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
R5 0.019 0.014 0.028 0.038 0.096 0.128 0.109 0.094 0.073 0.022 0.020 0.019 
R6 0.921 0.607 1.256 1.638 2.800 3.297 2.486 2.397 2.072 0.989 0.884 0.874 
R7 0.335 0.254 0.502 0.689 1.740 2.302 1.959 1.696 1.318 0.401 0.355 0.352 
R8 2.508 1.653 3.420 4.460 7.623 8.977 6.768 6.526 5.643 2.693 2.408 2.380 
R9 0.131 0.086 0.179 0.233 0.398 0.469 0.353 0.341 0.295 0.141 0.126 0.124 
R10 0.710 0.468 0.968 1.262 2.158 2.541 1.916 1.847 1.597 0.762 0.682 0.674 
R11 0.497 0.764 0.545 1.152 1.172 2.392 0.316 1.472 1.141 0.355 0.483 0.303 
R12 0.018 0.012 0.025 0.033 0.056 0.066 0.050 0.048 0.041 0.020 0.018 0.017 
R13 0.532 0.818 0.584 1.233 1.255 2.562 0.339 1.577 1.222 0.380 0.517 0.324 
R14 0.090 0.059 0.123 0.160 0.273 0.322 0.243 0.234 0.202 0.097 0.086 0.085 
R15 0.089 0.058 0.121 0.158 0.269 0.317 0.239 0.230 0.199 0.095 0.085 0.084 
R16 0.064 0.042 0.088 0.114 0.196 0.230 0.174 0.167 0.145 0.069 0.062 0.061 
R17 0.111 0.073 0.151 0.197 0.337 0.397 0.299 0.288 0.249 0.119 0.106 0.105 
S1 6.110 3.473 5.434 7.267 18.007 29.616 29.937 22.541 15.917 6.367 5.113 5.499 
S2 2.428 1.842 3.642 5.003 12.622 16.704 14.213 12.308 9.566 2.910 2.575 2.554 
S3 7.834 5.738 7.005 10.444 10.728 19.655 4.733 13.009 13.448 4.653 4.171 3.835 
S4 6.355 4.314 8.489 11.505 21.340 29.040 18.834 15.448 16.793 8.582 7.330 6.819 
O1 34.029 19.540 31.069 41.558 101.002 164.451 163.296 123.312 88.844 36.031 29.025 30.933 
 
 
Table B.3 Monthly water demand of consumptive uses (mcm). Agricultural uses require water 
resources only in the crop growing season from May to September, and their water demand is 
assumed to be zero in other months. 
  
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
A1 0 0 0 0 15.332 38.462 47.352 32.119 17.380 0 0 0 
A2 0 0 0 0 27.221 147.970 209.984 118.812 38.340 0 0 0 
A3 0 0 0 0 77.054 228.020 291.392 178.108 86.933 0 0 0 
A4 0 0 0 0 33.971 101.871 127.641 79.743 38.417 0 0 0 
A5 0 0 0 0 6.353 12.338 18.648 11.852 6.384 0 0 0 
A6 0 0 0 0 2.443 22.287 45.180 9.623 1.729 0 0 0 
A7 0 0 0 0 21.768 89.185 155.901 69.427 25.805 0 0 0 
A8 0 0 0 0 12.851 59.718 80.034 51.842 20.424 0 0 0 
A9 0 0 0 0 34.537 150.904 216.540 131.288 42.559 0 0 0 
D1 0.445 0.414 0.445 0.451 0.528 0.577 0.583 0.607 0.552 0.493 0.457 0.475 
D2 11.424 10.109 11.129 11.277 12.887 12.887 15.385 14.942 13.626 11.720 11.129 11.277 
D3 0.893 0.825 0.934 0.989 1.263 1.538 1.648 1.951 1.374 0.989 0.866 0.879 
D4 0.409 0.368 0.396 0.444 0.673 0.763 0.958 0.985 0.694 0.541 0.402 0.409 
 
 139 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
G1 0.420 0.392 0.420 0.426 0.499 0.545 0.550 0.573 0.522 0.466 0.431 0.448 
G2 6.152 5.444 5.993 6.073 6.940 6.940 8.285 8.047 7.338 6.311 5.993 6.073 
G3 1.058 0.978 1.107 1.172 1.498 1.823 1.954 2.313 1.629 1.172 1.026 1.042 
G4 0.485 0.436 0.469 0.527 0.798 0.905 1.135 1.168 0.822 0.641 0.477 0.485 
I1 8.345 8.345 8.866 9.388 14.812 15.334 15.647 15.647 13.561 13.039 8.345 8.345 
I2 9.209 9.209 9.785 10.361 16.347 16.922 17.268 17.268 14.965 14.390 9.209 9.209 
I3 0.919 0.919 0.976 1.034 1.631 1.689 1.723 1.723 1.493 1.436 0.919 0.919 
I4 3.046 3.046 3.237 3.427 5.407 5.598 5.712 5.712 4.950 4.760 3.046 3.046 
H1 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 
H2 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 
S1 17.503 17.503 17.503 17.503 35.006 35.006 35.006 35.006 35.006 17.503 17.503 17.503 
S2 75.526 75.526 75.526 75.526 151.050 151.050 151.050 151.050 151.050 75.526 75.526 75.526 
S3 33.354 33.354 33.354 33.354 66.708 66.708 66.708 66.708 66.708 33.354 33.354 33.354 
S4 37.655 37.655 37.655 37.655 75.310 75.310 75.310 75.310 75.310 37.655 37.655 37.655 
 
 
Table B.4 Monthly storage demand of reservoir nodes (mcm) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
R1 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 163.292 
R2 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 60.792 
R3 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 210.206 
R4 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 18.833 
R5 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 10.460 
R6 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 381.420 
R7 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 375.156 
R8 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 392.144 
R9 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 76.508 
R10 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 51.979 
R11 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 135.537 
R12 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 9.432 
R13 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 316.478 
R14 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 117.038 
R15 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 152.264 
R16 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 







Table B.5 Monthly minimum outlet flow (mcm) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
O1 72.649 54.157 77.695 110.160 110.160 110.160 110.160 110.160 110.160 102.109 80.058 71.730 
 
 
Table B.6 Water loss (consumption) ratios at agricultural uses (return flow ratio = 1 − loss ratio) 
  
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
A1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A3 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A4 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A6 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A7 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A8 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
A9 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
 
 
Table B.7 Water loss (consumption) ratios at municipal and industrial uses 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
D2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
D3 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
D4 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
G1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
G2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
G3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
G4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
I1 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
I2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
I3 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 









Table B.8 Choke quantity (Q0) of the monthly water demand function for municipal and 
industrial uses (mcm) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 0.233 0.217 0.233 0.236 0.235 0.257 0.259 0.270 0.246 0.258 0.239 0.248 
D2 6.582 5.825 6.412 6.497 6.469 6.469 7.723 7.501 6.840 6.753 6.412 6.497 
D3 0.503 0.465 0.526 0.557 0.616 0.750 0.804 0.952 0.670 0.557 0.488 0.495 
D4 0.200 0.179 0.193 0.217 0.274 0.311 0.390 0.401 0.283 0.264 0.196 0.200 
G1 0.249 0.232 0.249 0.253 0.260 0.284 0.287 0.299 0.272 0.276 0.256 0.266 
G2 3.955 3.500 3.853 3.904 3.995 3.995 4.770 4.632 4.225 4.058 3.853 3.904 
G3 0.639 0.590 0.668 0.707 0.797 0.970 1.039 1.230 0.866 0.707 0.619 0.628 
G4 0.258 0.231 0.249 0.280 0.362 0.410 0.515 0.530 0.373 0.341 0.253 0.258 
I1 2.608 2.608 2.771 2.934 4.629 4.792 4.890 4.890 4.238 4.075 2.608 2.608 
I2 6.273 6.273 6.665 7.057 11.135 11.527 11.762 11.762 10.194 9.802 6.273 6.273 
I3 0.700 0.700 0.744 0.788 1.243 1.287 1.313 1.313 1.138 1.094 0.700 0.700 
I4 1.113 1.113 1.182 1.252 1.975 2.045 2.087 2.087 1.808 1.739 1.113 1.113 
 
 
Table B.9 Choke price (P0) of the monthly water demand function for municipal and industrial 
uses ($/m3) 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
D2 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
D3 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
D4 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
G1 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
G2 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
G3 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
G4 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
I1 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 
I2 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 
I3 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 










Table B.10 Scale parameter α (k, t) of the monthly water demand function for municipal and 
industrial uses 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 0.443 0.413 0.443 0.449 0.526 0.574 0.580 0.604 0.550 0.491 0.455 0.473 
D2 12.531 11.088 12.207 12.369 14.466 14.466 17.270 16.772 15.296 12.855 12.207 12.369 
D3 0.957 0.884 1.001 1.060 1.378 1.678 1.798 2.128 1.499 1.060 0.928 0.942 
D4 0.380 0.341 0.367 0.412 0.613 0.696 0.873 0.898 0.632 0.502 0.373 0.380 
G1 0.412 0.384 0.412 0.417 0.487 0.531 0.536 0.559 0.509 0.456 0.423 0.439 
G2 6.529 5.777 6.360 6.444 7.475 7.475 8.924 8.666 7.903 6.698 6.360 6.444 
G3 1.054 0.974 1.102 1.168 1.490 1.814 1.944 2.301 1.620 1.168 1.022 1.037 
G4 0.425 0.382 0.411 0.462 0.677 0.768 0.963 0.991 0.698 0.562 0.418 0.425 
I1 7.846 7.846 8.336 8.827 13.927 14.417 14.711 14.711 12.750 12.259 7.846 7.846 
I2 9.919 9.919 10.539 11.159 17.606 18.226 18.598 18.598 16.118 15.498 9.919 9.919 
I3 0.969 0.969 1.029 1.090 1.719 1.780 1.816 1.816 1.574 1.513 0.969 0.969 
I4 2.335 2.335 2.481 2.627 4.145 4.291 4.379 4.379 3.795 3.649 2.335 2.335 
 
 
Table B.11 Price elasticity β (k, t) of the monthly water demand function for municipal and 
industrial uses 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
D1 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
D2 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
D3 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
D4 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
G1 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
G2 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
G3 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
G4 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.400 -0.400 -0.400 
I1 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 -1.202 
I2 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 
I3 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 -0.354 











Table B.12 Coefficient (b0) of the quadratic benefit function for agricultural uses 
 
b0 May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
A1 0.229384 0.229384 0.229384 0.229384 0.229384 
A2 2.809884 2.809884 2.809884 2.809884 2.809884 
A3 1.759267 1.759267 1.759267 1.759267 1.759267 
A4 1.147782 1.147782 1.147782 1.147782 1.147782 
A5 0.036077 0.036077 0.036077 0.036077 0.036077 
A6 0.201897 0.201897 0.201897 0.201897 0.201897 
A7 1.939695 1.939695 1.939695 1.939695 1.939695 
A8 1.841638 1.841638 1.841638 1.841638 1.841638 
A9 3.672924 3.672924 3.672924 3.672924 3.672924 
 
 
Table B.13 Coefficient (b1) of the quadratic benefit function for agricultural uses 
 
b1 May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
A1 0.053980 0.062118 0.065583 0.059591 0.057122 
A2 0.066166 0.106401 0.121373 0.102598 0.079602 
A3 0.059480 0.073461 0.078915 0.068518 0.063009 
A4 0.058646 0.070739 0.072021 0.071412 0.068277 
A5 0.055329 0.057303 0.066217 0.058034 0.055630 
A6 0.062923 0.090661 0.108761 0.090815 0.062056 
A7 0.072605 0.096342 0.124205 0.094469 0.077132 
A8 0.074814 0.111429 0.123685 0.112607 0.093616 
A9 0.077378 0.113501 0.128939 0.115394 0.088426 
 
 
Table B.14 Coefficient (b2) of the quadratic benefit function for agricultural uses 
 
b2 May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
A1 -0.000667 -0.000366 -0.000332 -0.000401 -0.000674 
A2 -0.000430 -0.000202 -0.000175 -0.000239 -0.000481 
A3 -0.000144 -0.000077 -0.000069 -0.000086 -0.000149 
A4 -0.000333 -0.000174 -0.000125 -0.000208 -0.000375 
A5 -0.001723 -0.000967 -0.000877 -0.001036 -0.001745 
A6 -0.004599 -0.000938 -0.000647 -0.002687 -0.007299 
A7 -0.000640 -0.000293 -0.000255 -0.000360 -0.000680 
A8 -0.001104 -0.000531 -0.000468 -0.000614 -0.001143 





Table B.15 Water cost for water withdrawal and diversion to municipal and industrial demand 
nodes ($/m3) 
 
 Water treatment Water distribution Wastewater treatment Total cost 
D1 0.1404 0.1092 0.2028 0.4524 
D2 0.0673 0.0659 0.1426 0.2758 
D3 0.0898 0.1197 0.1684 0.3779 
D4 0.0662 0.0691 0.1403 0.2756 
G1 0.1404 0.1092 0.2028 0.4524 
G2 0.0673 0.0659 0.1426 0.2758 
G3 0.0898 0.1197 0.1684 0.3779 
G4 0.0662 0.0691 0.1403 0.2756 
I1 0.1404 0.1092 0.2028 0.4524 
I2 0.0673 0.0659 0.1426 0.2758 
I3 0.0898 0.1197 0.1684 0.3779 
I4 0.0662 0.0691 0.1403 0.2756 
 
 
Table B.16 Water cost for water withdrawal to agricultural demand nodes ($/m3) 
 
 Pumping cost 























Table B.17 Initial reservoir storage (mcm) 
 
R1 163.292 
R2 60.792 
R3 210.206 
R4 18.833 
R5 10.460 
R6 381.420 
R7 375.156 
R8 122.545 
R9 76.508 
R10 51.979 
R11 84.711 
R12 9.432 
R13 98.899 
R14 117.038 
R15 152.264 
R16 15.000 
R17 99.272 
 
